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“As the geometrician, who endeavors
To square the circle, and discovers not,
By taking thought, the principle he wants,
Even such was I at that new apparition;
I wished to see how the image to the circle
Conformed itself, and how it there finds place;
But my own wings were not enough for this,
Had it not been that then my mind were smote
A flash of lightning, wherein came its wish.
Here vigour failed the lofty fantasy:
But now was turning my desire and will,
Even as a wheel that equally is moved,
The Love which moves the sun and other stars."

—Dante Alighieri, Paradiso
Canto XXIII, 133–145
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INTRODUCTORY PREFACE
Ex nihilo nihil fit. It is difficult to ascertain who precisely coined the phrase, but
the timeless wisdom contained within this brief but poetic verse is nothing short of
remarkable. Perhaps one should expect no less than that such a beautifully succinct
maxim would arise from the meditations and works of those who followed in the path of
those first “lovers of wisdom.”
Ever since the inception of human reason, questions concerning the nature of
causality have been pondered. In a long-forgotten era of human history, it was customary
to attribute the causes of certain phenomena to the action (or lack thereof) of supernatural
persons with unimaginable power. It was also not uncommon to suggest that these same
beings (or perhaps others, as is the case with the Titans of the Greeks) were responsible
for the creation of the world and all that is in it; that is, the idea of a “First Cause.”
Nowadays, more secular and materialistic models have come to occupy the spotlight
within the Academy, yet they share at least one thing in common with the myths of old:
both agree that nothing comes from nothing. Ex nihilo nihil fit.
It has become common in our postmodern era to point out that Christian theology
(or any other discipline, for that matter) is not done in a vacuum. The obviousness of this
claim may incline one simply to gloss over it without much thought. Of course the
theologians of old were particular people that lived in particular cultures within particular
eras and spoke to address particular problems. This much should be, and is, obvious.
What is not obvious, however, is the problems that this has raised for contemporary
Christian theology. Rather than noted as a mere observation or qualification as such,

1

oftentimes this fact is pointed out with a particularly malicious intent: to discredit the
positions of those being discussed. Bad theology, so it is suggested, arises from the
limitations that one’s place, time, and culture imposes upon one’s capacity for coherent
and sensitive theological reflection. Ex nihilo nihil fit.
Perhaps no era has become such a whipping-boy for contemporary theologians
and philosophers than the Middle (or so-called “Dark”) Ages. In light of the Reformation,
perhaps this will come as no surprise, as calling tradition into question surely betrays
some degree of break with it. Yet the Reformation’s skepticism of papal influence over
the Christian tradition in itself had a negligible impact upon theology when compared to
the Enlightenment and the subsequent rise of Modernism. As the Moderns spoke of the
“progress” humanity was making (particularly within the sciences), a simple comparison
would expose the Medieval period as a “regressive,” “primitive,” and “barbarous” era of
human existence; one which the world would presumably be better off without.
It was only a matter of time before such sentiments began to show within
Christian thought generally. Modernity’s sense of ethical superiority led to widespread
condemnations of the Church’s actions within the Crusades, Spanish Inquisition, and
colonization. As if accusations of moral backwardness were not enough, theologians
began to criticize the Patristic and Medieval thinkers for relying too heavily upon Greek
philosophy in their theological speculations. This twofold historical narrative—that both
pagan (i.e. Greek) thought and a lust for power (i.e. the Papacy) had “corrupted” the
originally Hebrew Christian faith—provided Enlightenment thinkers with the justification
they sought for the general rejection of Medieval thought.
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However, ex nihilo nihil fit; out of nothing, nothing comes. The majority of
Modern thought has defined itself in stark opposition to the Medieval period. But the
rejection of something can only result from an initial offer. If the Moderns were so
adamant about its rejection, then the Medieval world must have had something—
 not
nothing—to offer Modernity, and, clearly, whatever was offered could be of no little
consequence. This, if nothing else, should encourage us to take a second look at those
things which Modernism has rejected and, subsequently, forgotten.
*

*

*

A colleague of mine has suggested that half of academic work is telling other
people why they are wrong. The other half, he explained to me, consists of grading bad
papers. My hope is that this paper will (gently) accomplish the former whilst avoiding the
fate of the latter.
Initially, when I began my research for the present work, I hoped to examine
Aquinas’s position on time and eternity in the hopes of synthesizing it with contemporary
scholarship in Christian philosophy and theology. What I found, however, was that
modern scholarship has been quite critical towards the ideas of Patristic and Medieval
theologians, especially with regard to God’s relationship to time. In further pursuing my
research, I found that many contemporary theologians have elected to abandon entirely
the idea of a timeless God in favor of a more temporalist theistic framework. Though the
precise “mode” of divine temporality varies from thinker to thinker, the general trend is
evident: a timeless God is no longer philosophically, theologically, or otherwise relevant.
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It is with this lattermost trend that I take objection. I believe that Patristic and
Medieval theology is quite relevant with regard to this particular issue, especially (as I
hope to show) in light of recent philosophical, theological, and even scientific trends.
While contemporary criticisms of so-called “classical theism” have their place, it seems
to me that the present theological movement against the classical model may be unduly
reactionary and extreme, stemming in part from an improper understanding of ancient
thinkers and their ideas. This paper, therefore, examines the ideas and theology of St.
Thomas Aquinas concerning divine immutability, with the particular aim of suggesting
that modern sensibilities are well satisfied within the context of his theology. In so doing,
I hope to encourage future scholars and divine temporalists alike to study Medieval
philosophy to a greater depth; there are far more and greater treasures to be gleaned from
this rich period of Western history than those presented here.
This work is, without question, much too brief to accomplish what I have set out
to do. Such an undertaking is most formidable, and may well take a lifetime (maybe even
several lifetimes!) to accomplish. Nevertheless, I hope that this small contribution to the
discussion will be of benefit to myself and my fellow scholars-in-the-making. To this
end, I have cited other brilliant thinkers (themselves more studied than I) and attempted
to argue against their criticisms as best I can. I would have my readers understand that
my rhetoric within such argumentation—even where it may seem fierce—in no way
stems from a spirit of antagonism, but rather a spirit that strives to uncover the truth.
I anticipate that many of my readers will be in some way aligned with,
sympathetic towards, or otherwise familiar with contemporary movements in theology
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and philosophy of religion that posit, contrary to traditional Western thought on the
subject, that God is in some way subject to time and temporal change. Readers are
encouraged to be at least familiar with the thought of notable divine temporalists such as
Charles Hartshorne, Clark Pinnock, and William Lane Craig. In no way, however, is this
a necessary prerequisite for understanding the material therein; even familiarity with
more popular authors such as Gregory Boyd, I hope, will prove more than sufficient to
help the reader along with the ideas presented here. As for Aquinas’s work, I anticipate
most will not be as familiar; consequently, I have elucidated his thought in as much detail
as I can, such that those new to Aquinas’s work should follow along perfectly well.
In what follows, I first exposit Aquinas’s general position on divine immutability,
explaining as succinctly as possible Aquinas’s position and the way by which he arrives
at his conclusions. I then proceed to examine numerous general criticisms that have been
leveled against the Medievals and Aquinas in the past century, demonstrating that such
criticisms stem at least partially (if not entirely) upon various misunderstandings of
Aquinas’s work. After this, I address some more technical concerns that have been raised
by contemporary scholars William Lane Craig and R. T. Mullins, themselves both
formidable analytic philosophers of religion. Finally, I offer a few brief reflections as to
why I contend that Aquinas’s insights on the nature of God and time ought to be studied
more extensively (and be seriously reconsidered) in today’s philosophically and
technologically accelerated world. I do all this in the hope that, in the pages that follow,
readers will become as enamored as I have with Aquinas’s rich theological vision of the
motion of the immovable God.
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AQUINAS’S IMMUTABLE GOD
Aquinas on Motion and Divine Immovability
In order to understand Aquinas’s ideas regarding God’s immutability (that is, his
unchangeability), we must first understand his ideas regarding time, change, and motion;
all of which come primarily from Aristotle. Aristotle defined “movement” itself rather
broadly: instead of referring solely to spatial change, Aristotle defines “movement” as a
change from a potentiality to an actuality. These changes, for Aristotle, can take place
with respect to the substance, quality, quantity, or position of a given object1—that is, an
object can be said to “move” when it begins to obtain different substantial, qualitative,
quantitative, or spatial properties (and/or relations). In this respect, it could be most
succinctly said that Aristotle speaks of “motion” in terms of a “change of attainment”
more than anything else—an acquisition of new traits, properties, or relations previously
unpossessed. Borrowing this metaphysical framework for motion, Thomas Aquinas
observes that everything that actualizes its potential must have this change catalyzed by
some actualized object external to itself.2 Put another way, everything that is “in motion”
must be put into motion by something external to itself.
Aquinas notes that since God is the creator of all things, and creation is an act,
God must be “pure act”3—that is to say, God is not “potential” in the sense that He is put

Bodnar Istvan, “Aristotle's Natural Philosophy” (1st ed. May 2006; rev. Jan 2018). The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
2
“Nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.”
(Thomas Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.2, Art.3: Whether God Exists?” Summa Theologica [New York: Benziger Bros,
1947], 1:13).
3
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Aristotelian categories of act and potency. For a robust
treatment of act and potency as they pertain to Scholastic metaphysics in general, see Edward Feser,
Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2014), 31ff.
1
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in motion by something external to Him.4 Nor can God be a composite of both
“potential” and “action,” as this implies that there is differentiability in a God who is
metaphysically simple;5 thus, since there is no differentiability in God, Aquinas
concludes that God must be “pure act” and, if God is “pure act,” then there is no
“potential” in God and thus nothing which God can actualize. The implication follows
naturally: if God has no potential to actualize, then there is no way God can change, and,
hence, “move.”6 To reiterate the argument: everything that can be changed is in a state of
potentiality—that is, it can ( i.e. has the potential to) change into something it could be,
but is not. However, Aquinas contends that if God is pure actuality—that is, if God is
what He is7 and all He could be—
 then He cannot be said to have “potential” to any
degree, and so cannot change or be changed. Thus the God who is “purely actual” is also
unchangeable, since to change is to imply the potential to change, and God has no
potential, only act. Since God cannot change, then, it follows that He must remain
unmoved, for to “move” is to change from potentiality to actuality, given Aristotle’s
definition of motion.
Aquinas’s reasoning can thus be summarized as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

God is the First Mover
If God is not pure act, then He cannot be the First Mover
Therefore God is pure act
Movement is a change from potentiality to actuality
If God is pure act, then He has no potential to make actual

Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.9, Art.1: Whether God is Altogether Immutable?” Summa Theologica, 1:38. Strictly
speaking, an object which is “pure potential” could not exist, because in order for an object to have real
potential it must first have some actuality (that is, at the very least, it must actually exist).
5
That is to say, one substance, not comprised of parts. See Aquinas “Pt.1, Q.3, Art.7: Whether God is
Altogether Simple?” Summa Theologica, 1 :19. For a more detailed explanation of divine simplicity, see
James E. Dolezal, All That is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian
Theism (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017), 40ff.
6
Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.9, Art.1” Summa Theologica, 1:38.
7
C.f. Exodus 3:14a: “God said to Moses, “I A
 M W
 HO I A
 M.”
4
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6. Therefore God has no potential to make actual
7. Therefore God cannot change from potential to actual
8. Therefore God is immovable, by definition of motion
We can see that, thus far, Aquinas has made no impressive innovations,8 save the clear
articulation of the doctrine of immutability itself. Aquinas simply connects the
Aristotelian definition of motion (taken somewhat axiomatically)9 with the argument for
the existence of the Unmoved Mover. It should also be noted that Aquinas insists that
God is “pure act,” though he concludes that God remains unmoved. Clearly, this is not
“act” as we humans understand it, but something higher and, in a certain sense, far more
primordial than the mechanical sorts of “actualization” with which we finite beings are
familiar. For Aquinas, though God is said to be “pure act,” He remains Himself unmoved,
for to be moved implies a sort of “change of attainment” or “gain.” Since God’s being is
infinite, He cannot possibly lack or be added to; accordingly, then, it follows from all
these considerations that God must remain unmoved.10
Aquinas on Time and Eternity
The discussion of God’s relationship to time follows naturally from the discussion
of divine motion. Yet again, Aquinas borrows heavily from Aristotle, this time making
use of his definition of time. According to Aristotle, time is “the number of movement in

8

This is a generalization, as Aquinas was quite innovative in many ways, not least of which is the synthesis
he attempts between Aristotelian thought and Christian Neo-Platonism. Particularly, Aquinas has a very
robust understanding of what it means for God to be “pure act” that surpasses Aristotle’s comparatively
narrow understanding of the subject. For more on this technical aspect of Aquinas’s thought, see Michael J.
Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology on Divine
Immutability (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 127–130.
9
One could argue against Aristotle’s definition of change and time, but only to the detriment of modern
science, which depends largely upon Aristotle. See Edward Feser, Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical
Foundations of Physical and Biological Science (Neunkirchen-Seelscheid, Germany: Editiones
Scholasticae, 2019), 1f. & 233ff.
10
Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.9, Art.1” Summa Theologica, 1:38.
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respect of the before and after”;11 that is to say, time is the measurement of motion. As is
apparent from this definition, Aristotle linked time and motion very closely in his
metaphysical speculations. Though not going so far as to argue that time is motion, he
maintains that the two are inseparable, claiming that we can only apprehend or
understand time once we have designated certain times “before” and “after” with respect
to the motion of an object.12 However, motion is not merely the measure of time; for
Aristotle, the relationship goes both ways. He points out that we as humans seem to
measure both time by motion and space by duration; in other words, we measure space
and time by each other: “For we say that the road is long, if the journey is long, and that
this [the journey] is long, if the road is long—the time, too, if the movement, and the
movement, if the time.”13 Aristotle also observes that duration can be measured by
changes in our mental states, for if our mental states do not change, then we have nothing
with which to mark the passage of time, and so to us it seems that little time has passed
when, in fact, a great deal of it may have.14 Since movement is defined roughly as
“change” for Aristotle, time is primarily measured by the degree of change (or “motion”)
that has occurred in an object.15
Aquinas agrees with the Aristotelian linkage of time and space, himself assenting
that time is “nothing else but the measurement of before and after in movement.”16

Aristotle, “Time” in W. E. Kennick, and Morris Lazerowitz (eds.) Metaphysics; Readings and
Reappraisals (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 98.
12
Much like “length” can only be apprehended or understood with explicit reference to two (different)
points in “space.” See Aristotle, “Time” in Metaphysics, 96.
13
Aristotle, “Time” in Metaphysics, 99.
14
Aristotle, “Time” in Metaphysics, 96.
15
Those familiar with Einstein’s theories of Special and General Relativity will notice a striking similarity
to Aristotle’s ideas regarding time and space. This is addressed in the Appendix, for those interested.
16
Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.10, Art.1: Whether This is a Good Definition of Eternity, ‘The Simultaneously-Whole
and Perfect Possession of Interminable Life’?” Summa Theologica, 1:40.
11
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Motion implies change, and change implies temporal measurability; given an object in
motion, one should be able to measure some degree of change with respect to its “before
and after” a given change. In other words, the concept of motion is inextricably linked
with measurability and, hence, differentiation between two “points” of any given object.17
This leads Aquinas to suggest that, since time is primarily a measurement of change
“before and after,” time must not in any sense apply to God; to measure time is to
measure change, and to measure change is to differentiate between two points of a given
object, and differentiation cannot be found in God, for He is an absolute simplicity.18
Since God’s duration is not measured by time, then, it must instead be measured by
something else, which Aquinas calls “eternity.”
Borrowing a definition from Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy, Aquinas
refers to eternity as “simultaneously-whole,”19 explaining that the difference between
time and eternity is twofold. First, he says that time is divisible and categorizable into
“before” and “after,” while eternity is an indivisible unit of duration; to speak of “before”
and “after” in terms of eternity is nonsensical, for it is, in a sense, like a single moment in
that it is indivisible. Second, Aquinas argues that time and eternity are different
concerning their measurability by virtue of its indivisibility, since while the terms
“before” and “after” apply to time, they cannot apply to Eternity.20 Thus time differs from

17

The point here is that to measure some property of an object (such as length) is to differentiate between
two points of the same object. For example, one measures the length of an object from “one” end to “the
other”; two differing points on the same object. For more details on this aspect of Aquinas’s argument, see
especially Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.10, Art.4: Whether Eternity Differs from Time?” Summa Theologica, 1:43.
18
That is to say, God a real distinction cannot be made between God and His attributes. A popular way of
putting it is that God is not comprised of any “parts” which together constitute “God.” For our purposes, it
is only important to note that this means God is undifferentiable. See footnote 5 above, and Dodds, The
Unchanging God of Love, 100.
19
Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.10, Art.4” Summa Theologica, 1:42.
20
Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.10, Art.4” Summa Theologica, 1:42.
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eternity in that it is both differentiable and measurable while eternity is neither. So
similarly do these two attributes of eternity mirror the absolute unity (indivisibility) and
infinity (immeasurability) of God that Aquinas concludes—rather poetically, if somewhat
vaguely—that God is His own eternal duration.21
If, as Aristotle posits, time and motion are thus linked, Aquinas convincingly
argues that it stands to reason that timelessness implies immovability. Objects which
“always are,” according to Aristotle, cannot be moved, for then they would not “always
be”—that is, they would be temporal.22 As regards those things which “always are” as
Aristotle puts it, Aquinas argues that they must be called “eternal” insofar as they cannot
be measured by time because they do not change. The logical consequence is that those
objects which cannot be moved must not be in time, for if something could be moved,
then its (theoretical) motion could be measured by time. Consequently, Aristotle
concludes that objects that can move are necessarily temporal (because they have
unactualized potential), while Aquinas argues that those things which “always are” (as
Aristotle puts it)23 must be called “eternal” insofar as they cannot be measured by time
because they do not change: “any subject [which] is subject to change [...] recedes from
eternity, and is subject to time.”24

Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.10, Art.2” Summa Theologica, 1:41. It should be noted that this conclusion also comes
as a result of the doctrine of divine simplicity, which states that God cannot be differentiated; God’s
duration cannot be differentiated from God Himself, for this implies that a distinction can be made between
God’s being and act (i.e. His act of duration). But if God is pure act, then He must be His own act. Since
God is not comprised of parts, it follows that “everything that is in God is God,” as James Dolezal puts it.
22
Aristotle, “Time” in Metaphysics; Readings and Reappraisals, 100.
23
Aristotle, “Time” in Metaphysics; Readings and Reappraisals, 100.
24
Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.10, Art.4” Summa Theologica, 1:43.
21
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The Motion of the Immovable God
As we have seen above, Aquinas comes to two incredible conclusions about the
nature of God. First, Aquinas demonstrates that God is not only unmoved, but also
immovable, as He is pure act and has no potential whatever in Him. God cannot be said to
“change” because God is, in a sense, “already moved” from potential to actual. In other
words, God already is what He is, which is all He could be. Secondly, Aquinas derives
from this that God cannot in any way be measured by time; that is to say God is
temporally immeasurable. Since time is nothing but “the measurement of motion,”25 and
since “motion” (that is, change) cannot be properly predicated of God, neither can God’s
duration be measured by time. As time relies upon differentiation (and, hence, change) in
an object, and God cannot be differentiated, it follows that God cannot be properly said to
exist “in time.” This mode of existence apart from temporal measurability has been given
various names, ranging from “timeless” to “eternal.” Aquinas himself opts for the latter.
For our purposes, it will be sufficient for us to simply conclude that, for Aquinas, God is
incapable of being measured temporally on account of His immutability.
It should be considered, however, that, despite these conclusions—which seem to
have been derived from airtight reasoning—Aquinas cannot entirely escape the idea of a
God that is, in some respects, in motion; nor does he try to. As noted above, Aquinas
consistently reaffirms that God is “pure act,” and that no potential is found in Him.26 Yet
“act” is itself a dynamic, not a static, mode of existence. As we have seen, it is only
objects that are themselves in “act” or “motion” that are capable of actualizing the

25
26

Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.10, Art.4” Summa Theologica, 1:43.
Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.9, Art.1” Summa Theologica, 1:38.
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potential of other objects.27 Thus Aquinas concludes that God is somehow both dynamic
and unchanging.
Wedding these two concepts in our finite minds is difficult, as every instance of
dynamic “act” we are familiar with is directly linked with “movement”; the change from
potential to actual. To suggest something is static (i.e. not dynamic) is to suggest that it is
remaining in its potential, while saying an object is dynamic implies that it is actualizing
its potential. In both cases, potential is implied.28 Thus we (understandably) demand to
know: how can a “static” being such as Aquinas’s God participate in such a dynamic
mode of existence? The key is to divorce the concepts of stasis and dynamism on the one
hand and movable and immovable on the other hand.29 Only then will we realize that the
possibilities broaden, and we can begin to conceptualize an immovable dynamism; an
object or being that is “pure act,” and remains in this particular state unwaveringly.
The aforementioned limitations of our cognition (and, indeed, human language in
general) prevent us from fully grasping the high concept of God that Aquinas is putting
forth here. Aquinas argues that God is, in a sense, “immovable” not because He is devoid
of the ability to move; rather, Aquinas suggests that God is immovable in that He is
already moved; that God’s potential is already actual. Aquinas does not seek to
demonstrate that God is essentially unchanging; he only seeks to deny that God changes

See page 6, above. See also Aquinas, “Pt.1, Q.2, Art.3” Summa Theologica, 1:13.
Any finite object will never be completely rid of its potential, as it is finite and can always adopt new
spatial, qualitative, or relational properties. We say in physics that a ball is “at rest” (or “static”) when it is
not moving but could move. Even when we do see actualized potential, as when the ball begins to roll, it
still has potential in that it could have rolled the other direction, or it could roll faster. Thus finite objects
can never fully actualize their potential, as to gain certain forms of actuality is to lose other forms of it.
29
Alternatively, we can substitute “changeable and unchangeable” for “movable and unmovable.”
27
28
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insofar as “change” implies potentiality (and thus limitation) in God’s being.30 In fact,
Aquinas himself ascribes a type of “rectilinear” motion to God and—through a series of
somewhat convoluted arguments and observations in his On Dionysius the Areopagite's
“The Divine Names”—Aquinas declares, somewhat paradoxically, that “not only do
theologians attribute motion to God, but it is also granted us that we may fittingly praise
the motion of the immovable God.”31
These paradoxical conclusions are not the most intuitive, particularly in light of
recent developments within the Western theo-philosophical tradition. Increasingly,
Christians have come to reject many of the conclusions of Aquinas and other earlier
theologians, of which immutability is only one. Such critics argue that soi-disant
“classical theism” does not provide an adequate or coherent framework for Christian
theology. Yet it seems to me that all of their concerns (with regard to immutability, at
least) are well-addressed within Aquinas’s work.

Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love, 145.
Aquinas, In librum beati Dionysii de divinius nominibus expositio (caput 9 lectio 4), qtd. in Dodds, The
Unchanging God of Love, 58–59.
30
31
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GENERAL CRITICISMS OF AQUINAS’S POSITION
The doctrine of divine impassibility in particular has fallen out of vogue for many
that think a God who does not share in human suffering cannot be properly called
“Christian.”32 This has called into question immutability, simplicity, and a host of the
other “classical” attributes of God. Conceptually, the doctrine of impassibility relies
strongly upon the idea that God is immutable, such as is offered by the
Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical model. Furthermore, one recent idea in philosophy
has made it very difficult to suggest that timeless objects (and especially timeless
persons) exist—specifically, the idea that existence in general implies temporal
existence. These ideas, among others, have led to a general rejection of classical theism; a
trend which Brasnett, writing in the early twentieth century, very summarily articulates
(with specific regard to divine impassibility):
The reaction in our day from the traditional doctrine of the divine impassibility
[…] is often taken for granted in popular thought and exposition […] There is a
growing feeling that to make God a kind of passionless, scientific discerner
between good and evil is not to honour him but to degrade him, to give him the
emotionless precision of a machine, and rob him of the rich, full life of
personality at its best.33
Here Brasnett suggests that the shift away from the doctrine of impassibility (and
immutability) is a matter of moral concern for the modern Church; that God be
unaffected by human suffering seems heartless at best and cruel at worst.34
Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction (Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017),
182.
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Bertrand R. Brasnett. The Suffering of the Impassible God (London: Society for Promoting Christian
Knowledge, 1928), 15. Though writing in the early 20th century, Brasnett highlights many of the chief
concerns of those opposed to the Aristotelian-Thomistic model even today. As we shall see, many
contemporary concerns over the doctrines of impassibility and immutability are nothing new.
34
It is worth mentioning here that such moral concerns do not feature much in the works of the medieval
writers themselves, and where they are mentioned they are summarily addressed; it is only with the rise of
Modernism that we begin to see an emphatic shift in the philosophical and theological literature away from
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Of greater interest to us, however, are the metaphysical objections of divine
temporalists. Above, Brasnett helpfully indicates one such metaphysical point of
contention for the divine temporalists: many people think that if God is unchanging, this
implies that God is deprived of something. That is to say that, by being timeless, God is
unable to participate in something good; specifically, God is unable to participate in time
itself. This sort of thinking is exemplified by a number of contemporary writers, such as
Clark Pinnock and Gregory Boyd. Along this vein of reasoning, a similar argument
suggests that God is not perfectly free if He is immutable.35 Finally, and perhaps most
fatally, divine temporalists argue that God is incapable of being personal on the classical
model.36 Not all of these objections can be addressed here; nevertheless, some comments
about these general criticisms of Aquinas are in order, and in the process the reader may
find some general principles that will help to resolve these issues.
The Greek Objection
Coinciding with many of the modern critiques of the doctrine of impassibility in
general, the growing concern of the influence of Greek philosophy on the Christian
tradition certainly did not help the doctrine of immutability receive, as it were, a fair trial.
With the rise of thinkers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Adolf von Harnack37 in
the 18th and 19th centuries came the decline of Patristic and Medieval theological
divine being towards divine personality. A number of plausible causes could be cited, from the
Reformation’s challenge to existing theological authority to Romanticism and Existentialism as
philosophical movements. Only further research can determine precisely where this shift in thought began.
35
Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1977), 214–215.
36
See Robert C. Coburn, "Professor Malcolm on God," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41 (1963).
37
Incidentally, Harnack himself was cautious enough to note that, though much of the Catholic and
“Eastern Catholic” (i.e. Orthodox) churches have been severely altered as a result of their adoption of
Greco-Roman philosophy and customs, “Ecclesiasticism has not availed to suppress the power of the
Gospel” (Adolf von Harnack, What Is Christianity? [New York: Harper & Row, 1957], 266). Nevertheless,
his belief that institutional (Medieval) Christianity was corrupted by paganism tonally permeates the text.
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credibility, particularly with regard to the “classical” conception of God.38 Unfortunately,
contemporary scholarship has not shown much in the way of innovation with regard to
the “Greek-ness” of the ideas of immutability and impassibility. Boyd, for example,
argues that the Western world, since Plato, has been “infatuated with the idea of an
unchanging, timeless reality.”39 According to Boyd, time was seen by the Greeks as
inherently sub-par or “imperfect” compared to eternity. This conclusion is similarly
voiced by Thorleif Boman in his work Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek:
The Greek conception of time is put into words not least adequately by the fact
that time is assessed by Plato as well as by Aristotle […] partly as an evil.
Aristotle is in agreement with the maxim that time destroys […] everything grows
old […] and is forgotten in the course of time, but nothing grows new or beautiful
through time. Hence we [Western society] regard time in itself more as
destructive than constructive.40
Claude Tresmontant agrees,41 borrowing heavily from Henri Bergson, the 20th-century
French-Jewish philosopher, who argued that the Western (that is, Greek) tendency to
“individualize” time and treat it as a series of discrete, unrelated moments robs time of its
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That religious authority so “controlled” philosophical speculation in the Middle Ages is a common
assumption, one particular to secular and Protestant groups alike, especially after the advent of German
Liberal Theology, but this too is unfounded: “These reflections suffer from a completely unhistorical view
of the circumstances in which men think and act. […] To single out the Middle Ages as unique in respect of
the [limitation of free thought] is to be victimized by the propaganda against medieval thought which began
in the sixteenth century as a reaction of humanists and reformers […]” (Julius R Weinberg, A Short History
of Medieval Philosophy, [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964], 3). Strangely, however, this
was not always the case, as Dolezal points out that much of early Protestant theology was unashamedly
influenced by classical theism. See Dolezal, All That is in God, 37ff.
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Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids:
Baker Books, 2000), 130.
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Thorleif Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek (London: SCM Press, 1960), 128.
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corruption and dispersal. […] In terms of modern physics one might say that Greek thought seems to attach
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creative and life-giving properties.42 Hans Küng also notes this tendency,43 as does
Swinburne, who attributes the idea more to Neoplatonism’s influence on Christianity.44
There is not a little truth to be found in the above objections. One could easily
argue that, if God called His creation “very good,” this decree of “goodness” would seem
to include time, contrary to Aristotle, who himself acknowledged time’s fundamentally
corrosive nature: “Time is […] the cause of decay, since it is the number of change, and
change removes what is.”45 This pessimism of time is something that not only historically
dominates certain strands of Western philosophy, but also of a great deal of poetic (and
prosaic) literature through the centuries. It would seem, then, that the general Western
pessimism of time can be, in some ways, traced back to the Greeks. Furthermore, it could
be argued that this pessimism is contrary to the Christian idea that all of God’s creation
is, fundamentally, “very good.”
However, the pessimism of time is not the only strand of thought in the Western
world. Nor were the Patristics and Medieval theologians ignorant of the influence of
Greek philosophy on Christian thought.46 To suggest that Greek philosophy crept into
Patristic and Medieval Christian thought without the knowledge of the Church is naïve at

Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution. Translated by Arthur Mitchell (New York: Random House, 1944).
“Mediaeval theology, like that of the early Church, as a result of its dependence on classical Greek
philosophy, was inclined much more to a metaphysic of being than to a metaphysic of becoming […] the
notion of God’s immutability, taken over from Greek metaphysics, […] created a variety of difficulties for
the apologists and the later Fathers […]” (Hans Küng, “Hans Küng on the Immutability of God” in Alister
E. McGrath, The Christian Theology Reader. [New York: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2016],
200–201.
44
Swinburne, Coherence of Theism, 215.
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Aristotle, “Time” in Metaphysics; Readings and Reappraisals, 100.
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As alluded to in the Preface, much of this reaction was not to Greek philosophy as such but rather the
Scholastic interpretation and utilization of Greek Philosophy. A great summary of the development of the
myths surrounding the so-called “Dark Ages” can be found in Edward Grant, Science and Religion, 400
B.C. to A.D. 1550: From Aristotle to Copernicus (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 2–12.
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best and gravely insulting at worst.47 Furthermore, the “hellenization thesis,” as it were,
does not itself demonstrate the falsity of the doctrine of divine immutability. To suggest
that the doctrine of immutability must be discarded simply because it came from Greek
sources is nothing more than an expression of the genetic fallacy—albeit a pious one.48
Unfortunately, it seems that many scholars have come to see it as fashionable (and, in
some respects, obligatory) to point out this particular “fact” about divine
immutability—as though the Greek origins of the idea had not been suggested by a
hundred others before them.49 Such claims, at this point, seem to be of little constructive
influence, save that it attracts the attention of those in support of the thesis that
Christianity must “purge” itself of such “pagan” philosophical speculations.
Faith and Reason
One such manifestation of the aforementioned aversion to Greek influence on
Patristic and Medieval theology can be found in the work of Charles Hartshorne.50
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And particularly so with Aquinas: “It is a misrepresentation of what really happened to imagine that a
young Thomas turned to Aristotelianism because it had become modish and that he thus became
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48
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Following in the footsteps of Alfred North Whitehead, Harshorne has served as
something of a popularizer of Whitehead’s “process theology,” the influence of which
has (to a certain minimal extent) resulted in the recent academic shift towards divine
temporalism.51
Characteristic of the anti-Greek-philosophy sentiment, Hartshorne argues that “if
theology is to be emancipated from metaphysical assumption and argument, […] it
cannot be taken over ready- made from the work of older theologians [who have
borrowed from secular metaphysics].”52 However, Hartshorne’s reasons for criticizing the
Medievals are more nuanced than they may initially seem. Rather than succumbing to
basic anti-Hellenization rhetoric (as we have seen many scholars are prone to doing),
Hartshorne instead goes deeper, arguing that the Medieval theologians were wrong to
utilize metaphysics in their theological speculations as a result of methodological
fallibility: “both secular reason and revelation are fallible.”53
Ironically, however, Hartshorne then proceeds to overreach his own claims with
his personal preference for logical positivism. Seemingly oblivious to his earlier
statement about the fallibility of secular reason, he argues that, since faith claims are
necessarily true or false, the claims of Medieval theology regarding God’s immutability
are false because Modernity has “proven” them false:

Process Theology’s conception of God is primarily one of social function; one that is “temporalistic” in
nature. According to Hartshorne, the theory denies immutability and timelessness on the grounds that all of
reality is (per the title of Hartshorne’s book) “social process.” This is not to say that there are no absolute or
unchanging aspects of said reality, but that these “immutable” aspects of reality are constantly changing in
relation to mutable aspects of reality and, in this respect, change. See Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social
Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), 134–135.
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I believe that metaphysics is, in ideal possibility, a genuine expression of reason,
but that in historical achievement it has in good part been a failure […] I hold that
among the most successful of the efforts of metaphysicians are those which go to
prove the erroneousness of certain elements in the main stream of orthodox
theology […] Modern philosophy, with increasing unanimity and emphasis,
declares that whatever the highest truth may be, it is not to be found in certain
theological tenets [such as immutability] for which almost innumerable
theologians in various churches have stood.54
The problem with this should be evident. On the one hand, Hartshorne is quick to
emphasize that, in the case of the Patristic and Medieval theologians, secular reason is
fallible; meanwhile, in the case of Modernist criticisms of earlier theologians, Hartshorne
insists that said criticisms are “among the most successful of the efforts of
metaphysicians.” Here Hartshorne must abandon one thesis or the other: either the
Patristics and Medievals are justified in their use of philosophy, in which case Hartshorne
must prove that their use of philosophy is somehow wrong; otherwise, he must discard
the thesis that Modernist criticisms of Aquinas and others are valid, in which case the
discussion becomes irrelevant. Opting for neither, we are left instead with Hartshorne’s
unjustified preference for Modernism; a rather disappointing and singularly unconvincing
treatment of the subject.
There is a deeper issue with Harthorne’s treatment here. Not only does his esteem
of logical positivism undercut his own argument, but it renders himself incapable of
properly interpreting Aquinas’s theology. Generally, logical positivism is somewhat
problematic within a Scholastic framework; however, it is fundamentally opposed to
Aquinas’s understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. To understand this,
one need look no farther than logical positivism’s claim that everything that is
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meaningfully true can be proven rationally or empirically.55 Aquinas, on the other hand,
believed that not all truths can be so proven:
All science is derived from self-evident and therefore seen principles; wherefore
all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen […] that which is proposed
to be believed by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are
the things which are of faith simply.56
For Aquinas, of all true things, only some can be “seen” (literally and
metaphorically) as objects of reason, whereas others can only be known by faith. By this,
he means that there are limits to the things which can be either empirically “seen” (i.e.
with our observation of the physical world) or rationally “seen” (i.e. through logical
demonstration and deduction). Consequently, for Aquinas, not all true things can be
proven by reason; some can only be known by faith. Ettiene Gilson explains Aquinas’s
position well:
To have faith is to assent to something because it is revealed by God. And now,
what is it to have science? It is to assent to something which we perceive as true
in the natural light of reason. The essential difference between these two distinct
orders of assent should be carefully kept in mind by anyone dealing with the
relations of Reason and Revelation. I know by reason that something is true
because I see that it is true; but I believe [by faith] that something is true because
God has said it. 57
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Gilson further explains that, as a result of the distinction between these “orders of
assent,” Aquinas maintains that we should never attempt to substitute the function of one
mode of knowledge for the other; that is to say, we should not assent to an object of
rational truth by faith, nor confess belief in an article of faith as a result of necessary
demonstration. For Aquinas, “believing” and “knowing” truths require two different
media of apprehension.58 It is a small wonder, then, how Hartshorne comes to conclude
so radically different than Aquinas on everything from the place of metaphysics and
theology to God’s relationship to time. What Hartshorne calls “metaphysics” or “reason”
would not ever be called such by Aquinas, who held that merely suggesting that those
things which are necessary demonstrations of reason could be false deprives the word
“truth” of all meaning.59
In the end, then, Hartshorne has left us with a supremely underwhelming
examination of the issue. His arguments against the Patristic and Medieval use of
philosophy are unquestionably self-refuting, but, more fundamentally, they are ignorant
of the basic presuppositions of pre-Modern (sc. Scholastic) Christian thought. Perhaps
most disappointing is not his unjustified preference for logical positivism and Modern
thought in general, but the fact that even granting these assumptions, he provides little in
the way of constructive thought on the issue. It seems, then, that Hartshorne’s preference
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for Modernism is nothing more than an appeal to novelty, heightened by Modernity’s
general case of “chronological snobbery.”60
The Via negationis
While Hartshorne and others seem skeptical of the appropriateness of
philosophically driven theology, others try the classical model on the basis of supposed
methodological issues. Gunton, for example, takes aim at Aquinas’s conception of God
by suggesting that the dialectical methodology of the Patristic and Medieval theologians
was fundamentally flawed and, consequently, led them to a number of erroneous
conclusions. Specifically, Gunton criticizes the use of “negative theology,” particularly as
expressed and formulated through the Medieval via negationis:
Negative theology has in effect driven out the positive […], so that the God who
makes himself known in scripture has been turned into one who cannot be known
as he is […] the divine attributes have been conceived largely […] in terms of
timeless relations between the eternal and the temporal, to the exclusion of
attributes suggested by divine action in time.61
Charles Hartshorne has voiced a similar impression of the via negationis: “it was
believed that the inadequacy of the human mind to comprehend the divine could be
mitigated only be negating our conceptions, deity being the meaning that remains after all
our ideas, unworthy as they must be, are set aside.”62 However, more often than not, the
via negationis is misunderstood as making a positive statement a bout properties or
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attributes of God. Consider, for example, Mullins’s explanation of divine immutability:
“to say that God is immutable is to say that He is necessarily unchanging in regards to
His essential properties.”63 This is a prime example of an incorrect understanding of the
place of the via negationis in Aquinas’s theological method. Contrary to Mullins, to say
(as Aquinas did) that God is immutable by way of the via negationis is not to say that
God is essentially unchanging; rather, it is to say that God does not change—
 particularly
insofar as “change” is defined as the gain or loss of certain attributes. This is exactly what
Aquinas states in the Summa:
Everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to
what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite [and possesses all
perfection in His being], He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to
anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way
belongs to Him.64
It is important to recall that “movement” here is a technical term that is synonymous with
the word “change” in the ordinary sense. Aquinas therefore utilizes the via negationis to
say, roughly, that God does not change (insofar as change is defined as the gain or loss of
attributes).65
The misunderstanding here lies in the ignorance of the fact that to make this
negative statement (“God is not changeable in this manner”) is not necessarily to attribute
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a positive attribute to God (i.e. “God is essentially immutable”). Aquinas himself is very
careful to specify the place of the via negationis in relation to how we speak of God:
“Negative names applied to God or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly [i.e.
“Immutable”] do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance [that is,
difference or “otherness”] of the creature from Him.”66 Thus, when Aquinas argues for
God’s “immutability,” this should not be seen as a descriptor of God’s essential
unchangeability; rather, it should be seen as a denial of mutability insofar as mutability
testifies to a lack of infinite being. 67
If such were the whole of the story, one could argue that the disagreement here is
just fundamental in nature—that the place of the via negationis in philosophical theology
is merely a matter of debate. However, though Aquinas’s contemporary opponents are
quick to criticize the via negationis, they remain conspicuously silent about its
relationship to the other two “ways” of speaking about God; namely, the way of causality
and the way of eminence.68 Dodds (citing Aquinas) helpfully summarizes the place of the
three in the work and thought of Aquinas:
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We know and speak of God through our knowledge of creatures, using the ways
of causality, negation, and eminence. Through causality, we know ‘whether he is’
and recognize ‘his relationship […] to creatures as the cause of them all.’ By
negation, we see ‘the difference of creatures from him inasmuch as he is not any
of those things which are caused by him.’ Through eminence, we find that
creatures ‘are not removed from him by reason of any defect on his part, but
because he super-exceeds them all.’69
In brief, then, it could be said that the way of causality demonstrates to us the existence
of God and certain necessary truths about him, such as can be found in Aquinas’s
arguments for the existence of God using Aristotle’s metaphysics. The way of eminence
discusses God’s positive characteristics in the superlative sense, such as God’s possession
of all power or all knowledge. For the via negationis, the impetus is to clarify the
distinction between creaturely being—or “becoming,” as has become popular to
say—and divine Being.
The Medieval via negationis is thus not, as many seem to suggest, an attempt to
contrast God as much as possible from man. It is, rather, part of a robust tool kit that
Aquinas (and other Medieval theologians) have employed to speak about God as
accurately as possible. It is to use man’s understanding of his createdness in an effort to
discuss God, precisely what Gunton and others have accused the Scholastics of ignoring.
Certainly, positive comparisons can be made between the Creator and His creation, but
there are also many negative contrasts which must be made. Specifically with regard to
the doctrine of immutability, Dodds continues:
Through the way of negation we know and speak of God in terms of his absolute
distinction from creatures, denying of him every aspect of creatures that implies
limitation or imperfection. Since motion as found in creatures implies limitation
in its very definition […] it must be denied of God. When we say God is
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immutable according to the way of negation, we mean simply that motion, insofar
as it implies limitation and imperfection, does not belong to God.70
Even with all this said, however, to not ascribe creaturely m
 otion to God through
the via negationis is not to suggest that God does not move at all. To see this, we need
only to consider that, per the via eminentiae, anything in creatures that is a positive good
can be “supereminantly” ascribed to God; that is to say, such good traits can be properly
ascribed to God, though in a nuanced and unfathomably higher sense than can be
conceived by finite humans. This would mean that the positive traits of motion which can
be found in temporal creatures, such as dynamism and vibrancy, can b e predicated of
God. Thus movement can be predicated of God insofar as “movement” implies
dynamism and animation (as opposed to stasis and stagnation). However, God’s
“movement” as such must be thought of as a type of “movement” that is “supereminant”
and (consequently) quite different than the “movement” we are familiar with. Recall that
Aquinas himself says “not only do theologians attribute motion to God, but it is also
granted us that we may fittingly praise the motion of the immovable God.”71
It seems, then, that the objections of Gunton, Hartshorne, Mullins, and others to
the doctrine of immutability on the basis of its reliance upon the via negationis is
ill-founded at best, betraying an ignorance of Aquinas’s basic methodology. More
importantly, however, we can see how Aquinas’s rich theological explanation of God as a
“dynamic stasis” also addresses the earlier objections that we turned away from earlier.72
The claims that an immutable God must “lack” some aspects of “the rich, full life of
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personality at its best”73 are refuted by a proper use of the via eminentiae, w
 hich suggests
God possesses all creaturely goods supereminantly. God cannot possibly lack any good
things which are to be found in the creation; therefore, Aquinas is in full agreement that
movement can and must b e predicated of God, insofar as motion can be conceived of as a
perfection. However, in a proper and technical sense, that God can “move” in this
supereminent sense does not negate or work against the conclusion that God must be
immutable, for God is necessarily immutable in respect of His simplicity and pure
actuality.
Unfortunately, we have only scratched the surface of the numerous
misconceptions which have led to such disputations over immutability. It will not be the
last time that we shall see that ignorance has become a source of significant controversy
surrounding the classical conception of God, and particularly the doctrine of
immutability.
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TECHNICAL CRITICISMS OF AQUINAS
We have seen that many popular or general criticisms of Aquinas have fallen
short of meriting serious consideration. There are, however, a number of more technical
criticisms which do warrant more substantial answering. Contemporary philosophers of
religion such as Alvin Plantinga, William Lane Craig, and Richard Swineburne have
become increasingly popular in Evangelical circles, and not without cause; of Aquinas’s
recent critics, they deserve mention and response for their more substantial objections. In
particular, William Lane Craig and R. T. Mullins’ objections to the doctrine of divine
immutability pose a challenge to anyone considering Aquinas’s position on the subject.
An apparent flaw in Aquinas’s general conception of divine immutability has to
do with the concept of God sans creation.74 That God is Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover
seems obvious, and is demonstrated by Aquinas’s arguments found both in his Summa
Theologica and elsewhere. A contradiction and counterargument to Aquinas’s conclusion
of divine immutability, however, can be easily derived when one considers whether God,
as the Unmoved Mover, could be said to have the property of “having created the
universe” sans creation.
Craig’s argument, in essence, suggests that, while it seems appropriate to call God
the Unmoved Mover after He has already created the universe, “prior” to this creation, it

This terminology, so far as I can tell, was coined by William Lane Craig (in his Time and Eternity) to
refer to God in His eternal being “prior” to the existence of the universe. While discussions of anything
“before” the creation of time itself (assuming time was created) are nonsensical, it seems nevertheless
imperative for Christian theologians to discuss the aspect or “period” of God’s existence that excludes the
creation and existence of the universe. See William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's
Relationship to Time (Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2001), 233–236. However, some (sc. process
theologians) have criticized any discussion of God’s being prior to or sans the creation as unfruitful at best
and nonsensical at worst. See also Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process.
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seems it would be inappropriate to say that God is the “Unmoved Mover” because, sans
creation, God does not move anything and, hence, could only be called “the Unmoved.”
Put in more philosophical terms, it seems as though the property of “being the Unmoved
Mover” does not apply to God sans creation; this property only applies after creation. In
fact, it seems that, sans creation,  G
 od’s properties are minimal; surely He possess those
traits and properties implied by only by His aseity,75 but post-creation it seems that God
takes on a number of new properties. Furthermore, post-creation, it seems as though God
inevitably adopts a whole new class of properties; namely, he seems to adopt relations to
the temporal objects which He has created, and (particularly) the persons which God
creates. Thus it seems that God sans creation lacks a number of properties that He
possesses only post creation.
The implications of this are significant, because it turns Aquinas’s argument for
God’s “pure act” on its head. Since God sans creation has some potential properties
(such as “being a creator”), one could suggest that God must be partially potential. But if
God is also simple, then He must be “pure potential”76 and, thus, entirely mutable. Just as
Aquinas argued towards God’s immovability and immutability on the basis of His having
purely actual properties, so too one could argue that, if God has at least some potential
properties, then He is mutable. This is the main conclusion of both William Lane Craig
and R. T. Mullins, and it is this conclusion that I will contest in the following pages.
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God and “Real” Relations
However, Aquinas himself was not ignorant of this “flaw” in his reasoning. In
response to the suggestion that God adopts relations to His creation at the moment of
creation, Aquinas argued that God does not bear “real relations”77 to created objects
despite the fact that all objects bear “real relations” to Him. William Lane Craig has
criticized Aquinas’s position on precisely this point:
This is certainly an extraordinary doctrine [and] is very problematic. God’s
sustaining the world is a causal relation rooted in the active power and intrinsic
properties of God as First Cause. […] To say that the world is really related to
God by the relation is sustained by but that God is not really related to the world
by the relation is sustaining is unintelligible. It is to say that one can have real
effect without a real cause—which seems self-contradictory or
incomprehensible.78
At first blush, it seems that Craig is correct in his analysis, since Aquinas himself
maintains that:
Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are
ordered to Him, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself;
whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but only a relation in idea
inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him.79
However, one would be amiss to conclude from this alone that Aquinas thinks that God
bears no relations to the world whatsoever. This is because the above quote, taken out of
context, seriously misrepresents Aquinas’s thinking on the subject. Most astonishingly,
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Craig neglects to mention that Aquinas uses the term “really related” in a specific
technical sense:
There are […] relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for
instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that
applies to both; as is clear of all relations consequent upon quantity; as great and
small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the
same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power
and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.80
Aquinas’s heavy use of jargon here can make for difficult interpretation. The key thing to
note in this passage is the phrase “according to some reality that applies to both.” In
Aquinas’s mind, “real” relations between two objects are relations that are “realities as
regards both extremes”—that is to say, the two objects bear relations in regard to some
shared reality. For instance, in suggesting that one given bowl is smaller than another,
one describes a “real relation” between the two bowls in virtue of their shared physical
existence and “real” relative properties. Thus, for “real relations” to exist between two
objects, the objects must share a common reality or, put in the words of Aquinas, “one
order” of being.81 Dodds explains this well:
Among creaturely agents, there is a real relation between cause and effect. The
transient causal motion produced by a creaturely agent is distinct from the form of
the agent. […] Through this action, the agent in some way imparts actuality to its
effect […] when the gas flame heats the frying pan, for instance, the act of heating
belongs to both the flame as agent and the pan as receiver. By reason of this
common act, the agent and its effect belong in some way to the same order [of
being].82
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Given such a definition of “real relations,” Aquinas proceeds to deny that God can bear
such relations to His creation because God and creation do not share the same order of
being:
Sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme
it is an idea only: and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order
[of being …] they are called relative not forasmuch as they are related to other
things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, [the relation of
“being on the right side of another object”] is not applied to a column, unless it
stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the
column, but in the animal.83
This type of relation, one in which each relatum belongs to a different order of
being, is commonly referred to as a “mixed relation.” Since God’s creative action is not
mediated through a common order of existence between God and creation,84 any “mixed”
relation that God bears to the creation can only be “real” for the creation. This follows
from the observation that the creation depends upon God for its existence, and not the
other way around.85 Thus the “real” end of the relationship obtains for the creation only,
and not for God. This, I think, sufficiently clarifies Aquinas’s puzzling remark that “it is
manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real
relation to creatures.”86
Thus, despite the fact that Aquinas denies that a “real relation” can exist between
God and creation, it is apparent that Aquinas does not suggest God bears no relations to
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the world at all; rather, Aquinas maintains that the relationship between God and his
creation is necessarily asymmetrical. It seems, then, that Craig’s popular criticisms of
Aquinas, at least, are founded upon gross misunderstandings of Aquinas’s thought.87
The Truly Related God
Unlike Craig, R. T. Mullins88 has avoided such a facile interpretation of Aquinas
in his work The End of the Timeless God:
When Aquinas denies that God is really related to creation, he is saying that a
[“real relation”] does not obtain between God and creatures because God cannot
have any accidental properties. […] Creatures are really related to God because
they depend upon Him for their existence, and have an appropriate accidental
relational property. God, however, is not really related to creation, but only exists
in a relation of reason to creation.89
Mullins, however, criticizes Aquinas on another front, arguing that “the denial that God is
really related to creation brings about severe incoherence within Christian theology and
practice.”90 Particularly, he maintains that the denial of “real relations” in God leads to
religious subjectivism. Mullins observes that we not only predicate titles of God such as
87
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“Creator” and “Savior,” but we also invoke such titles in liturgy and prayer. If Aquinas is
correct, Mullins suggests that this means liturgical invocations of these titles are
self-referential because they “instead express a property of our minds. […] We are only
expressing things about ourselves and not anything about God.”91
However, as he continues, it seems to me that Mullins does not quite have the full
picture of the nuance of Aquinas’s thoughts on “real relations” as he initially appears.
Mullins takes it as incredible that “anyone who is a Christian theological realist could
actually believe this notion that the accidental predicates like Creator and Redeemer are
not true of God but only true of ourselves.”92 Aquinas himself, however, seems to suggest
precisely the opposite of what Mullins is here accusing him of!
God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to him: and
since the relation of subjugation is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord
not only in idea but in reality; for he is called Lord according to the manner in
which the creature is subject to Him.93
Contra Mullins, Aquinas is not attempting to suggest is that titles such as Creator
and Redeemer cannot be “truly” predicated of God; instead, Aquinas is trying to clarify
that God does not “adopt” such relations in a manner that implies or amounts to a change
in Him. It is by virtue of change in the creation (namely, the change from nonexistence to
existence) that God is called Creator, not in virtue of change within God: “there is
nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being
predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the
change of the creature.”94 Much the same could be argued of the titles Lord and
Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 123.
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Redeemer. Aquinas, then, does not disagree with either Craig or Mullins that God is, in
some way, truly (though not “really,” in the technical sense) related to the world. In fact,
Aquinas goes so far as to almost contradict himself (by implying a change in God) to
stress precisely this point which Craig and Mullins are so concerned about:
Though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord
includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, Lord and
servant, are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not Lord until He had a
creature subject to Himself.95
That Aquinas would go so far as to almost imply change in God to stress the point
that God is truly predicated by the temporal names Lord, Creator, Redeemer, etc. is
evidence that the concerns of Craig and Mullins are not foreign to Aquinas. Yet, despite
the apparent consonance of thought between Aquinas and these contemporary scholars,
they are insistent upon opposing Aquinas as a result of their incorrect interpretation of his
work. Craig, it seems, has misconstrued Aquinas’s terminology to such an extent that his
opposition to Aquinas’s claim that God is not “really related” to the world is
underwhelming at best. For his part, Mullins fails to acknowledge that, though Aquinas
denies “real” relations of God, this does not preclude one from arriving at the conclusion
that God can and must be “truly” related to the world. Thus it appears that, insofar as
Aquinas’s understanding of God’s true (but not “real”) relation to the world is concerned,
Craig and Mullins fall short in their analysis.
The Problem of Possible Worlds
A final criticism worth mentioning is that of God’s relationship to other “possible
worlds.” Generally speaking, a number of contemporary philosophers of religion have
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had difficulty reconciling Aquinas’s thought with contemporary modal logic, particularly
as codified in formal modal reasoning systems (of which the “possible worlds” semantics
are only a part).96 While a detailed exposition on the nature and scope of modal logic
cannot be given here, Mullins’s explanation of possible worlds semantics should provide
adequate for an unfamiliar reader to proceed.97
An example of the problems that possible worlds semantics poses for Aquinas can
be found in Craig’s work:
[In a logically possible world where] God had not chosen to create a universe at
all, He would surely have a different will than that which He has [...] He would
know different truths than the ones He knows [...] He would not love the same
creatures He actually loves [...] Incredibly, however, Aquinas denies this. It is the
implication that God is perfectly similar in every possible world we can conceive
[...] But then it becomes unintelligible why this universe or any other universe
exists rather than nothing. The reason cannot lie in God, for He is perfectly
similar in all possible worlds. Nor can the reason lie in creatures, for we are
asking for some explanation of their existence. Thus, on Thomas's view, there just
is no reason for why this universe or any at all exists.98
Craig asserts that, if God could have chosen not to create the universe, this semantically
implies that, at some point, there was a potential which God could have actualized but
elected not to. This inference seems reasonable enough, yet it should be obvious that it
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implies potentiality within God, which is in direct contradiction with Aquinas’s
conception of God as pure actuality. The consequences of this for the doctrine of
simplicity (and, hence, immutability) are fatal; if God could have acted other than He has
at any point in human history, then God must not be simple.
If Craig’s argument holds, it would seem that Aquinas’s position on God’s pure
actuality is mistaken. If God would have had different properties or relations in a
different possible world—that is, one in which God created a different universe (or not
created one at all)—then it follows that God has unactualized potential and is not “pure
act.” Since the doctrine of immutability and the other “classical” attributes of God are
closely tied to the doctrine of divine simplicity (i.e. God’s pure actuality), it would follow
that drastic revisions to these doctrines would be required. Clearly, then, Craig’s
reasoning is of no little consequence.
Be this as it may, however, I suggest that an examination of the possible worlds
semantics in use will reveal that, useful and popular as they are in contemporary
metaphysics, such semantics assume far more than they demonstrate. In particular,
Craig’s modal semantics assume a common order of being99 between God and creation.
This has been argued by James Dolezal, who maintains that possible worlds modal logic
in general suffers from this deficiency.100 Possible worlds semantics describe the world in
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terms of a “maximal state of affairs”—of which God is assumed to be only one.101
However, Dolezal suggests that treating God as any other object within a “possible
world” assumes that God is on a level of esse that is analogous to that of the
creation—that is to say, it assumes a common mode of being between God and creation;
an assumption which is completely foreign to Aquinas’s work.
The problem with the above arguments against Aquinas, then, is that—by virtue
of using “possible world” modal logic at all—Craig assumes a common order of being
between God and creation rather than demonstrating that such an order of being exists.
With this (unjustified) assumption, Craig is fully capable of concluding that God must
have potential (and thus be complex) if and only if God and his creation share an order of
being. Such a conclusion, however, is not revolutionary, nor does it prove that God is
complex—unless it could also be proven that God and the creation share an order of esse.
This fact, coupled with the more general uncertainty about the viability of contemporary
modal logic,102 makes Craig’s argument on the basis of “possible worlds” suspect at the
very least.103
However, even granting such a common order of being between God and
creation, it seems to me that suggesting that God “could have done otherwise” than He
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has in the actual world simply presupposes divine potentiality rather than demonstrating
it. Consider Craig’s claim that “If God had not chosen to create a universe at all, [...] He
would know different truths than the ones He knows.”104 While this statement may be
true, does this really imply that a God who chose not to create is different than from the
God that has chosen to create? According to Aquinas, the difference is not to be found in
God, but in the world; in this instance, the list of “truths” to be known is what changes,
while God remains immutably knowing. Much like the temporal names which can be
predicated of God, it is thus by virtue of change in the world that God’s knowledge and
relation to it changes, not by virtue of change in God Himself. That God knows remains
constant; it is only what God knows that could be said to change. Thus God’s act of
knowing need not change in order to accommodate temporally “new” knowledge.105
Furthermore, Craig here assumes that God’s action is distinct from His being,
contrary to the doctrine of divine simplicity. While it may be reasonable for one to
dispute the doctrine of divine simplicity directly and thus conclude God’s mutability,106
Craig simply derives that God is not simple and has potential by assuming that God is
complex (i.e. that God’s being and knowing are separate). The reasoning is circular, and
so it seems Craig’s argument asserts divine temporality more than demonstrates it.
Consequently, the argument fails, and Aquinas’s stance remains uncontested.
Craig, Time and Eternity, 89.
The question about whether God’s knowledge is variable is a hotly-debated subject largely revolving
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Mullins, for his part, wholeheartedly agrees with Craig’s reasoning and, thus, falls
under many of the same criticisms I have raised against Craig. To Mullins’s credit,
however, he avoids the assumption that God is complex, instead arguing for divine
complexity on the basis of God’s free will:
Could God have refrained from creating the universe? If God is free then it seems
that the answer is obviously ‘yes.’ He could have existed alone. Yet, God did
create the universe. If there is a possible world in which God exists alone, God is
not simple. He eternally has unactualized potential for He cannot undo His act of
creation. He could cease to sustain the universe in existence, but that would not
undo His act of creating.107
Anticipating a possible rebuttal, he continues:
One could avoid this problem by allowing for a modal collapse. One could say
that everything is absolutely necessary. Necessarily, there is only one possible
world—this world. Necessarily, God must exist with creation. There is no other
possibility. God must create the universe that we inhabit, and everything must
occur exactly as it in fact does. There is no such thing as contingency when one
allows a modal collapse.108
Mullins then goes on to point out that such a “modal collapse” is “odious to Christian
theology” for various reasons, including the denial of divine and creaturely freedom of
will. Mullins rightly points out that such a modal collapse seems to imply a form of
fatalism and, as a result, poses significant problems for the standard Christian positions
on the problem of evil and moral responsibility, among other things.109
In considering such questions, it must be first of all pointed out that we have
officially departed from theology as “scientific” endeavor insofar as our considerations
henceforth cannot help but be highly speculative. No Christian can rightly claim to know
the mind of God; “Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his
107
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counselor?”110 Nevertheless, Mullins’s objection here seems fair, and well deserves an
answer. Should Christians really be so willing to hold fast to simplicity and immutability
that they deny God’s freedom to create?
Foremost, it is evident that God has created the world. From this, it is clear that,
whatever the case may be, God has willed the world to be. If God has so willed the
universe to be, one might well ask why God did not will the universe to be different.111 In
a certain analogical sense, perhaps we may think it makes sense to ask such a question, as
we humans are well aware of the fact that our decisions have consequences and that these
consequences vary with our actions.
However, when we conceptualize an infinite, all-powerful, all-wise, and
all-benevolent being that is supremely self-sufficient and self-fulfilled, one may begin to
wonder if the question even applies to such a being. Whatever the goals of such a being
in creating the universe as we know it, is it plausible to even think that such a being can
fail to obtain that which it is seeking? If it is possible, then we are not thinking of an
infinite being, but a finite one. If impossible, then how could the universe be but one
way; the way which the infinite God has desired and decreed?
Admittedly, such speculation is vague and perhaps ill-formed (not least insofar as
“desire” implies lack, which a being such as God cannot have). Nevertheless, it does not
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seem so far-fetched to suggest, contra Mullins, that there is indeed only one way things
could have turned out: the way things have in fact been, and will in fact be. Though, far
from depriving God of His freedom of will, it seems that this vision of God—one that is
supremely unrestricted in actualizing the one and only universe that He wills—exalts
God’s sovereignty rather than detracts f rom it.
Doubtless, Mullins would criticize such a position for its lack of intellectual rigor.
Yet I would pose the following argument in challenge to Mullins and those who would
side with him: are “possible worlds” possible insofar as they are logically comprehensible
(i.e. that they are “logically possible”), or insofar as they are willed by God? It seems to
me that a possible world could not obtain unless God so desired it to obtain. But all
“possible worlds” are defined as “possible” in that they could (possibly) obtain. To this
end, one could argue that all “possible” worlds which God does not desire to obtain are
necessarily impossible, since they could not possibly obtain. This includes every
so-called “possible world” in which God is different than He is in the actual world, as an
omnipotent God could not fail to be as He so desired to be. Since God desires to be what
He is in the actual world, and He could not fail to be different than He desired to be, there
is no “possible world” in which God is different than He is now. Since the remaining
possible worlds are, necessarily, those in which God does not vary from world to world,
it does not follow from Mullins’s argument that “God could have been different than He
is,” because, in fact, God could not be different than He already is.
It seems to me that this line of reasoning demonstrates a form of “modal collapse”
that is not odious, but rather quite necessary for Christian theology. Nor does it entail that
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there is only one possible world: any possible world can be conceived in which God is
the same as He is in the actual world. Yet this conclusion seems to support—rather than
detract from—Aquinas’s understanding of divine simplicity and, hence, divine
immutability.
The above considerations aside, I would think it naïve to conclude that Mullins’s
concern has been addressed in its fullness. The dilemma faced by the theologian is to find
a sufficient reason by which to explain the fact that the actual world obtains out of the
innumerable worlds God seemingly could have actualized. In some ways, it is doubtful
whether such a question could ever have a satisfactory answer; it may well haunt the
Church for the rest of time. Be that as it may, I have attempted to demonstrate that
Christian theologians can uphold Aquinas’s position on divine immutability reasonably,
despite Mullins’s insistece to the contrary. Concerning the same issue, Dodds has an
insightful reflection that is worth quoting at length:
Our remarks regarding the act of the divine will are necessarily halting and
inadequate since the operation of God’s will infinitely exceeds the capacity of our
thought and language. In what we say, we do not seek to explain the mystery of
God’s will, but only to preserve it from our all-too-human tendency to reduce God
to something we can understand. At the same time, in answering the hypothetical
question that we have posed regarding what God ‘might do’ or how God ‘might
be,’ we refuse to abandon the actual truth that we have discovered about what
God is: that God is pure actuality, ipsum esse subsistens, and that as such he is
(unlike us) absolutely simple and unchanging. It is of course tempting to deny our
ignorance and to pretend instead that God’s will is like our own, with a multitude
of acts, some of which would be different or changed if God did not will the
creation of the world. But if we yield to that temptation, the God of whom we
speak will be only a human God, made in our own image. He will be only a
‘pretend’ God who ‘might be this’ or ‘could be that.’ He will no longer be the
God of transcendent mystery who has made us in his own image and likeness and
who reveals himself as ‘He who is’ (Ex. 3:14).112
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A WAY FORWARD
Thus far, I have attempted to elucidate Aquinas’s position with regard to divine
motion in some detail. I have also tried to show that various criticisms, general and
technical, fall short of satisfactorily demonstrating the falsity of the doctrine of
immutability. As yet, Aquinas’s doctrine goes unchallenged. Be this as it may, however,
a thesis not proven wrong is not necessarily right. The remainder of this work will
attempt to argue for the plausibility of Aquinas’s position, and will look at the merits of
reconsidering the classical conception of God with respect to immutability. Because
Aquinas’s conclusions have been argued for and defended both by Aquinas himself and a
compendium of contemporary Thomists, I will not endeavor to rehash the arguments of
others; instead I offer my own reflections as to why Aquinas’s view is relevant to
contemporary philosophical theology.
Philosophical Superiority of Divine Simplicity
In the first place, it seems to go without saying that the doctrine of divine
simplicity (upon which the doctrine of immutability is based) is far more philosophically
tidy than any doctrine of divine composition. Generally, it seems apparent that divine
simplicity satisfies the most basic of the philosopher-theologian’s needs: the need for a
single, unified cosmological principle to serve as the foundation for the rest of reality.
The doctrine of divine simplicity is meant to correct any proclivity we might have
toward conceiving God’s being as dependant upon principles or sources of being
more basic than His own divinity. This temptation is very real insofar as
everything else we know and experience is composed of parts. […] But a God
composed of parts is unworthy of our worship because He is not the highest being
[…] If other theological proposals about God do not conform to this most
fundamental conviction of His existential absoluteness […] then we run the very
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real danger of worshipping that which is not the unsurpassable and most absolute
being.113
In many ways, however, divine simplicity is the heart of the disputation between the
classic and modern conceptions of God. Medieval theology, in its discussion of the
classical attributes of God (such as those given by Aquinas), unanimously assume divine
simplicity, whence we see that immutability follows necessarily from God’s undivided
being.
Contemporary theologians would not disagree with this lattermost point, though it
is for this precise reason that divine temporalists conclude that God must be complex.
Craig and Mullins argue that divine simplicity is problematic because it implies
immutability, which they reject. The logical consequences of a simple, immutable God, it
is argued, are so reprehensible that it could not possibly be true.114 Consequently, they
conclude that God must be complex because God is mutable. But surely this is the wrong
way to go about resolving the issue! One could just as easily argue the other way around:
since divine complexity is problematic, and Craig and Mullins base their argument for
divine complexity upon divine mutability, divine mutability must be incorrect!115
Here it is appropriate to make another note of some interest. Most opponents of
Aquinas (including Craig and Mullins) do not argue directly against his reasoning for
immutability; his syllogisms for immutability go untouched. Rather, those who argue for
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divine mutability attempt to construct a reductio ad absurdum to show that immutability
is incompatible with other aspects of Christian belief, such as the creation of the world or
the Incarnation.116 Yet if divine immutability were truly an unreasonable a priori
hypothesis (as Mullins and Craig seem to argue), then one would think that a critical
reading of Aquinas’s argument would reveal some fatal, glaring flaw, either in
assumption or syllogism. Yet such an appraisal does not seem to have been made;117
indeed, perhaps Aquinas’s airtight reasoning has ensured that it cannot be made.118
Setting aside the soi-disant “reprehensible” conclusions of divine immutability, it
seems that divine simplicity in itself is a much more reasonable assumption to make. If
we were to assume the alternative—namely, that God is complex—it follows that He
would then be composed of parts. But whence do these parts originate? The implication
is that the components of God must have some origin outside of God, which is
problematic for orthodox Christianity’s claim that God is the sole origin of everything.
Furthermore, divine complexity implies that God’s existence is contingent upon the
existence upon His component parts; an idea in stark contrast to that of God as a

See Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 99ff. & 156ff.
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metaphysically necessary Source of all contingent being. Assuming divine complexity,
then, seems to fly straight in the face of everything that Christians have historically said
about God. Accordingly, it seems that divine simplicity, considered in itself, is a
philosophically and theologically superior position to divine complexity by, in my
estimations, a wide margin; far more than a few, uncompelling reasons should be given
before its wholesale abandonment.
In Defense of Faith and Reason
A second strength of Aquinas’s position regards his epistemological position
regarding the relationship between faith and reason. His belief that “science” and “faith”
are two media of knowledge—one which is mediated by reason and empirical
observation, the other which is mediated through the reception of knowledge from an
authoritative119 source—enables Aquinas to hold apparent contradictories in a tension
otherwise impossible. Since Aquinas believes that the immutability of the First Mover is
a necessary conclusion of reason, he firmly holds to the doctrine of divine immutability.
However, he is also capable of holding in equal esteem the truth of faith that God is the
Good from which all other goods derive, and as such God must possess mutability insofar
as mutability can be a perfection. Thus Aquinas’s unique epistemology allows him to
hold these two truths in paradox.120
This is not so for the divine temporalist—though the shortcoming is less the fault
of divine temporalism as much as it is Modernism in general. For Modernity, if truths of
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faith and reason seem to contradict, one must be right and the other wrong because all
truth is, supposedly, in accordance with and intelligible by human reason. Corolarrily,
anything incomprehensible by human reason is de facto discarded as contradictory and
false. By thus collapsing the dividing line between the truths that can be apprehended
only by faith on the one hand and those apprehended by reason on the other, the new
philosophy effectively makes impossible Aquinas’s paradoxical idea of the “most-moved
Unmoved Mover.” This way of thinking stems largely from the epistemic revolution of
early Rationalism, whence divine temporalism derives its general epistemological tools.
Paradoxically, however, divine temporalists allegedly combat against the Rationalists by
their subordination of Reason to Revelation (which explains at least in part why divine
temporalism has become popular in Evangelical circles).
Despite this, divine temporalism is far more Rationalistic than its proponents
would perhaps care to admit. Generally, for the divine temporalist, the necessary truths of
reason are set aside for the “superior” truths of faith—i.e. the “philosophical” veracity of
immutability is trumped by the theological necessity of divine mutability. Yet implicitly,
it could be argued that this is not actually the case, as the entire impetus for discarding
one of the paradoxical claims is based upon a prejudice of reason which suggests that the
two members of the paradox are in fact contradictory. It is an idea of reason (viz.
Rationalism) that the articles of faith and reason should wholly overlap and be entirely
comprehensible with one another. Thus, the estimation of divine mutability over divine
immutability as “the superior truth of faith” is not actually an act of faith, but instead a
superposition of preconceived reason over faith.
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It is, therefore, Modernism that is unable to abide with logical tension, not
Christianity.121 Ironically, the divine temporalist movement, for all its praise and esteem
of the Hebrew aspects of the early Christian faith, is terribly discontent with the Jewish
propensity to live by paradox. In contrast to this dissatisfaction with not knowing, it is the
mark of genuine Hebrew (and, by extension, Christian) faith to be capable (as Aquinas
is) of abiding with paradox in full tension. G. K. Chesterton spoke well on this subject in
his Orthodoxy, worth quoting at length:
By defining its main doctrine, the Church not only kept seemingly inconsistent
things side by side, but, what was more, allowed them to break out in a sort of
artistic violence otherwise possible only to anarchists. […] It is true that the
historic Church has at once emphasised celibacy and emphasised the family; has
at once (if one may put it so) been fiercely for having children and fiercely for not
having children. It has kept them side by side like two strong colours, red and
white, like the red and white upon the shield of St. George. It has always had a
healthy hatred of pink. It hates that combination of two colours which is the
feeble expedient of the philosophers. […] So it is also, of course, with the
contradictory charges of the anti-Christians about submission and slaughter. It is
true that the Church told some men to fight and others not to fight; and it is true
that those who fought were like thunderbolts and those who did not fight were
like statues. All this simply means that the Church preferred to use its Supermen
and to use its Tolstoyans. […] It is constantly assured, especially in our Tolstoyan
tendencies, that when the lion lies down with the lamb the lion becomes
lamb-like. But that is brutal annexation and imperialism on the part of the lamb.
That is simply the lamb absorbing the lion instead of the lion eating the lamb. The
real problem is--Can the lion lie down with the lamb and still retain his royal
ferocity? That is the problem the Church attempted; that is the miracle she
achieved.122
See Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 6f: “Ineffability is an ill-judged metaphysical compliment
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What is most appropriate for the Christian, then, is a theo-philosophcial position that is
capable of accounting for the apparently contradictory truths of faith and reason. Such a
position, I argue, cannot be found in post-Rationalist, post-Enlightenment Modernity,
with its preference for reason over and above faith. Aquinas, on the other hand, does
allow for such paradoxical tension to exist, and even in such a way that his position, by
limiting the respective domains of faith and reason, accords with both. This, then, is
another point in favor of Aquinas’s general position.
Analogical Language and Primordial Being
Aquinas’s sharp distinction between divine Being and creaturely being is yet
another point in favor of his position. Equating God’s form of existence with ours is
perhaps one of the most elementary blunders of contemporary philosophical theology. To
suggest that the Uncreated Creator “exists” the same way that a created creature “exists”
is much like saying Sir Arthur Conan Doyle exists in the same manner as Sherlock
Holmes. That God and creation share different classes or “orders” of being seems almost
necessary for the Christian to hold. Yet many contemporary philosophers and theologians
have instead begun to treat God as though He were simply one being among many.123
The issue arises in part as a result of disagreements over the nature of theological
discourse; specifically, whether certain things ought to be predicated of God literally or
analogically. For divine temporalists, “motion” must be applied to God literally (i.e. God
actually moves and changes), while Aquinas suggest that it can only be predicated of
God analogically. The difference is not, as some would argue, that applying motion to
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God analogically is somehow less true than predicating it of God literally; rather, it is a
difference of the kind of truth being addressed, whether literal or analogical.
Consider, for example, the claim that God is a “rock.” Is God literally or
analogically a rock? The answer, clearly, is the latter; God is not literally made of stone,
but by way of analogy we can attribute certain characteristics of rocks (i.e. steadfastness,
solidity, etc.) to God. Not let us consider the claim that God is “divine”; is it to be
literally or analogically predicated of God? Clearly literally; the very definition of
“divine” and “God” demands it. These examples highlight an important aspect of
predicative language: the truth of a predicate is not dependant upon whether it is applied
to God analogically or literally; rather it is dependant upon whether it is appropriately
predicated of God, whether that be in an analogical or a literal sense (i.e. an analogical
truth predicated analogically, or a literal truth predicated literally).
Thus it is not so much that the claim that “God must, in some respects, change or
be able to change” is fundamentally erroneous. In fact, as I have demonstrated, the
intuition is correct that, insofar as immutability implies static imperfection, God is not
immutable.124 However, the difficulty arises when contemporary theologians insist that
all things must be predicated of God literally. By describing God in primarily relatable
(that is, analogical) terms rather than attempting to understand God as He is, divine
temporalists confuse truth with literal predication. This is not the case with all
contemporary thinkers, to be sure; but it seems that the usage of “ordinary”
language—which emphasizes God’s relatability and mutability—has become so
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commonplace in discussions of metaphysics and philosophical theology that the
conclusions of divine temporalists are, in many ways, inescapable.
An example of this is the common misunderstandings of the term “real relation,”
as we examined earlier. The phrase is a technical term used in Aquinas to describe a
particular type of causal relation between two objects. A “real relationship,” according to
Aquinas, entails a common mode of being between relatum, whereas a “mixed
relationship” obtains between objects with different orders of being. The precise nature of
this theological language, when rightfully differentiated, resolves any misunderstandings
of the issue. However, when a layperson (or contemporary theologian) hears or reads that
Thomas Aquinas states that “God is not really related to the world,” the ordinary usage of
the words in question suggests that God does not bear any relations to the world
whatsoever. To be clear, Aquinas does believe that God bears relations to the world, they
are just not “real” relations. However, as we have seen, authors such as Craig have either
misunderstood or misconstrued this to mean that Aquinas thinks God bears no relations
to the world, only “imaginary” relations.125
Though genuinely well-meaning, the push for the abolition of theological jargon
in theological discourse has been damaging to Christian theology. Assuming a common
mode of being between the Creator and the created (that is, by assuming that God “be”
the same way we “be”) destroys the distinction between God and man.126 Some might
argue that the “destruction” of the “distinction between God and man” is precisely what
Christ attempted to do in the Incarnation, but the point is missed that the Incarnation loses
125
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its significance if there is no metaphysical distinction between Creator and created. How
impressive is it, really, if a being—one that exists just as everything else—became
something else? At best this is common, and hardly to be lauded since we humans change
in this way all the time.
On the other hand, what are we to say to the idea that God, in His infinite and
primordial Being, the Ground of Being Himself, became finite and ordinary being,
contingent and fragile? This is a paradox beyond mystery; yet it is pregnant with
precisely the high Christology so rightly praised by 20th century Neo-Orthodoxy. The
greatness of the God who “became what He was not so that Man could become what He
is”127 is fittingly magnified in this paradoxical mystery of the Christian faith, that the
infinite God became finite man. But such a mystery does not and cannot exist for the
contemporary philosopher of religion, who treats God as just another being among
beings. For him, God has not traversed the infinite to dwell in the finite, He has only
changed His form among the finite. The classical position, held by Aquinas and many
others, seems yet again the only position that can be reasonably called “orthodox.”
The Vision of the “Most Moved” Unmoved Mover
It seems to me that, beyond the above considerations, perhaps the most
compelling reason for adhering to Aquinas’s general position (that is, the classical
position) is the grand vision of God granted by it. It is my belief that the beauty and
grandeur of a hypothesis should bear equal weight in considering questions of truth, as
the highest truth is too beautiful to be contrived by man. Ergo, where two hypotheses are

127

See Irenaus’s Against Heresies, book 5 and Athanasius’s O
 n the Incarnation, section 54.

55

otherwise considered equal, the more elegant, grand, and mystifying should be preferred
over the more clumsy, mundane, and base. Are the contemporary doctrines of divine
complexity, myopic knowledge, and divine finitude to be preferred over those of
Aquinas—divine simplicity, the bifurcate cooperation of faith and reason, and doctrine of
primordial being—as more beautiful?
This is, admittedly, not an argument so much as an elegy for the pervasively
scientific study of God that theology has become. Nevertheless, it almost goes without
saying that we humans are not only extrinsically, but intrinsically, changed by time. Our
duration is in constant flux, and whatever small changes we experience often snowball
into significant personal changes that affect who we are as people, affecting even our
inmost being. “Becoming” is the only mode of existence we know. It is therefore difficult
for us to imagine the existence of anything which is uncreated, and which remains
unchanged by the experience of time. Yet in no way does the “otherness” of an object
preclude its existence, nor the implicit incomprehensibility of an eternal God’s work in a
temporal world any case for His temporality.
Therefore the same sense of bafflement, confusion, and wonder with which
Christians have historically articulated and confessed such doctrines of the Tri-unity of
God must be present in any Christian doctrine of God’s relationship to time. It must
articulate, to some degree and in some way, the paradox of (apparent) contraries; “a
mystery revealed, but not understood.” In light of this, it seems to me that contemporary
attempts at demonstrating and exhaustively defining God’s duration in terms of temporal
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extension lack the sense of wonder and awe of the “otherness” of God; a sense which is
well evoked in Aquinas’s writings on the subject.
That this particular crisis of philosophy and theology stems from the West may
come as no surprise to some, and particularly historians of chronometry. Time has
become something like a god of in the Western world, perhaps to the degree that
Christians concede that even their deity is subject to it? What modern Westerner,
enslaved as he is to society’s hyper-awareness of time and its ceaseless chronological
motion, would not presume that this all-encompassing and utterly binding force, had not,
in some way, managed to chain down God Himself?
Doubtless, such a question will come across as brash at best and rhetorically
charged at worst. Naturally, it is not the disposition of divine temporalists to “enchain”
God to time, but to “liberate” Him from the static conception they have of Aquinas’s
temporally immeasurable Unmoved Mover. How little, however, does their idea of an
immutable God look like Aquinas’s; how much indeed it does have in common with the
deistic clockmaking god of theModernists, who are probably more to blame for the
Medievals' disrepute than any. Were the divine temporalists to glimpse for one instant the
grand vision of the “motion of the immovable God,” they too might join Aquinas in
saying “I can do no more. Such secrets have been revealed to me that all I have written
until now seems to me like straw.”128
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CONCLUSION
Concluding a paper with as many topics, studied in as much depth and breadth as
I have presented in the foregoing pages, is difficult and perhaps impossible to do to
anyone’s full satisfaction, my own included. The truth of the matter is that, in many
ways, I do not wish to conclude this work, as the subject is one of continual fascination
for me. I hope the reader will be as enamored by these issues as I am, and that the
thoughts contained herein have sparked a curiosity that will consume them in a grand
desire to plumb the riches of Aquinas’s thought. Regrettably, however, we must draw our
considerations to a close.
Summary
Aquinas’s formulation of the doctrine of immutability borrows heavily from
Aristotelian conceptions of motion and time. For Aquinas, Aristotle’s ideas lead
necessarily to the conclusion that God is immovable and, hence, temporally
immeasurable. These conclusions rely upon the assertion that time and motion are
linked—a Greek idea which has come to be one of Aquinas’s chief criticisms with regard
to the doctrine of immutability. Despite the difficulties raised by Aquinas’s arguments,
however, he is careful to maintain that though God is atemporal, this does not inhibit His
ability to act in any way. In fact, for Aquinas, God’s temporal immeasurability seems to
imply that He possesses a higher, more perfect degree of “motion” and “action” than any
temporal being could hope to attain.
We have examined Aquinas’s argument for divine immutability in detail. The
conclusion that God is immutable follows from God’s infinite, simple, and pure actuality,
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which are in turn derived as a necessary conclusion from God’s status as the Prime
Mover of reality. Given Aquinas’s epistemology, however, he simultaneously (and
paradoxically) affirms that, while finite “motion” cannot be ascribed to an infinite God,
the “goods” of motion—personality, vitality, and responsiveness—can be ascribed to
God supereminantly. Thus God can “move,” but this motion must be understood as a
“primordial” sort of motion, one which does not imply substantial change in God. This
“dynamic stasis” of God necessarily eludes all human comprehensibility, but for Aquinas
it is essential to uphold both the necessary truths of reason and the revealed truths of
faith. That God is unmoved is true by reason, while that God moves is also true, though
not by reason but by faith.
We examined numerous general objections to divine immutability, including the
claim that Aquinas’s position should be rejected because of its Greek inspiration, that his
“negative theology” constitutes an invalid theological method, and that immutability robs
God of “the rich, full life of personality at its best.”129 Each of these objections has failed
to demonstrate the insufficiency of Aquinas’s position. In response to the Greek
objection, I have argued that in its basic form it is merely a pious example of the genetic
fallacy, while in the more nuanced views of Hartshorne it comes to be self-contradictory.
Contrary to the claim that Aquinas’s negative method is theologically invalid, I have
shown that the via negationis is not only an indispensable component of any serious
theological methodology to distinguish between Creator and created, but that it is in fact
only one component of a more robust toolkit; comprised also of the via causalitatis and
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the via eminentiae. This lattermost tool helps us answer the final general objection by
necessitating that the goods of creation find their higher and proper Source in their
Creator. Accordingly, aspects of the existence that we finite humans enjoy (including
motion!) can appropriately be ascribed to God, though only in a higher and more
primordial sense. We also noted that many of these objections seem to stem, in part, from
a general misunderstanding or mischaracterization of Aquinas’s epistemology or
theological method in general.
Proceeding to more technical arguments against Aquinas’s position, we saw that
the objections of William Lane Craig and R. T. Mullins are similarly based upon
misconstruals of Aquinas’s theology. First, we examined Craig’s claim of God’s
mutability on the basis of the supposed difference of divine properties sans and
post-creation. We saw that such an argument assumes a common order of being between
the Creator and the created (thus destroying the Creator-creature distinction) rather than
demonstrate it. Further, Aquinas argues that such “differences” in divine attributes sans
and post-creation are not the result of change in the purely actual essence of God, but
rather the change is to be found in the transient properties of the created world. We saw
that R. T. Mullins’s objection that we cannot truly call God “Savior” without implying a
“real relation” between God and man was based upon a misunderstanding of Aquinas’s
technical term “real relation,” and ignorance of Aquinas’s emphatic insistence that such
names may be “truly”—though not “really,” in the technical sense—predicated of God.
Finally, we examined the viability of “possible worlds” semantics in general, arguing that
the assumed order of being between God and creation necessary to ascribe modality to
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God causes problems for Christian theology; as a result, Mullins’s modalistic argument
against divine simplicity is circular and fails to demonstrate his conclusion.
In addition to the above considerations, some reflections upon Aquinas’s position
provide something of a positive argument for its importance. Of chief note is the
intuitiveness of the doctrine of divine simplicity, upon which Aquinas bases the doctrine
of immutability. Secondly, the sharp distinction between Creator and created, offered by
Aquinas’s idea of “orders of being,” provides an important framework for the predication
of divine attributes to God. Rather than complicating the Incarnation, however, the idea
that God’s infinite Being is nothing like our finite being seems to make it all the more
significant: the wholly infinite and immutable God paradoxically becomes finite and
mutable; ”the” Being becomes “a” being. Aquinas’s respect for this paradox bolstered his
unique epistemology, which makes a clear distinction between the nature and media of
sense-knowledge (reason) and revealed knowledge (faith), thus enabling the Christian to
firmly hold both the necessary truths of reason and the revealed truths of faith in full
tension. Finally, I argue that Aquinas’s rich, grand vision of God is unrivaled in terms of
its beauty and the awe it commands and, therefore, is more apt to be true than any
(comparatively inelegant) formulation of divine temporality.
The Western Synthesis
A final consideration of the relevance of this work has to do with the present state
of Western thought in general. It has been a number of centuries since the first fledgling
Modernists rebelled against the Scholastics, yet it has seemingly reached its end. The
Enlightenment project of pulling rational knowledge up by its own bootstraps has failed,
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and the “Age of Reason” has been replaced by epistemic pluralism. This philosophical
tension, maintained within the Academy for a number of years, has begun to bleed into
Western society as a whole. Fault lines between progressivists and traditionalists have
become aggravated, resulting in an increased dipolarity in politics, media, and culture in
general.
Compounding upon this issue is the accelerated rate of change in society, as well
as the sheer mass of information that has become almost a staple of our technologically
driven world. It seems natural that, as human memory is only so expansive, our heads
have become crammed with “information” and “facts” to the point that we have forgotten
much of our own history, let alone the significance of it. But memory is the first part of
learning; one cannot achieve a new synthesis by first forgetting what is to be brought
together. Yet the Moderns have all but forgotten what the Scholastics have offered; they
know only to reject it. Surely, such a mindlessness like this can only be to our detriment,
politically and academically.
It seems to me that, in order for the Western tradition to continue, a new synthesis
will have to be made between Scholasticism and Modernism. The innovations and
epistemic concerns by the Moderns can only be kept in check by the values and
metaphysics of the Scholastics. It has been suggested that Scholasticism, so focused on
preserving its own existence, has become stagnant, while it also seems Modernism has
crushed itself under the weight of its own presuppositions. It is for this reason that the
two intellectual traditions, defined in stark opposition to one another till now, will need to
forge a common framework within which science, religion, philosophy, art, politics, and
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history can all be positively advanced. The rebellious Modern will need to come to accept
and appreciate his wise father the Scholastic, while the Scholastic will need to recognize
the youth and vigor of his Modern child.
Incidentally, something very similar to this proposed Grand Synthesis was
attempted by Aquinas himself, though not with Scholasticism and Modernism; rather, he
forged a strong philosophic system that combined the Christian Neoplatonism of his day
with the newly rediscovered Aristotelianism. To this day, the Thomists continue in this
synthesis of Plato and Aristotle, while the Modern world has torn them asunder. Perhaps,
then, there will be no better way to forge this synthesis between Scholasticism and
Modernism than by first examining the work of the one who was able to bring those two
radically divergent worlds together.
Whether or not a proper synthesis of Aquinas’s robust metaphysics with today’s
scientific and philosophical progression can be achieved is uncertain. What is certain,
however, is that very little real progress can be made so long as Aquinas’s contemporary
critics and defenders talk past one another. My hope is that this paper has served to
highlight some potential areas of miscommunication and misunderstanding, and has
offered some potential starting grounds for further work to be done. To this end, I would
encourage readers to be vigilant and thoughtful of the ideas presented by Aquinas as well
as his fellow Patristic and Medieval thinkers. So much of their work has gone tragically
underappreciated, and it would be in the best interest of not only individual readers but
whole societies to further read and research these giants upon whose shoulders we stand.
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I personally have committed myself to this, and I would encourage any who have read
thus far to do likewise.
Final Thoughts
The challenge facing philosophers and theologians today is twofold. First is the
task of reaching up or returning to the truly great philosophers and theologians of
the past in order to be transformed by the truth and wisdom they communicate.
The second task is transposing that truth and wisdom to the manifold problems
and issues of today.130
Much ink has been spilt over the issues touched upon in the foregoing pages, and it
would be amiss to think that the brief reflections offered in this meager paper come
anywhere close to a full treatment of the subjects therin. Be this as it may, I believe I can
say that I have offered a modest defense of Aquinas’s position whilst simultaneously
demonstrating that misconceptions of Aquinas abound. Though some have come to see
Aquinas’s metaphysics of motion and time as a pagan stain on the Christian theological
tradition, contemporary readers would do well to appreciate the breadth of scope and
depth of reasoning that Aquinas offers; and, though over a hundred years of the Christian
tradition has seen a departure from the wisdom of the ancients passed down to us,
perhaps today’s Christians can still join Aquinas in the right and fitting praise of the
motion of the Immovable God.
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APPENDIX—MISCELLANEOUS NOTES AND UNFINISHED WORK
What follows is a list of miscellaneous thoughts and ideas which, for various
reasons, I elected not to incorporate into the final text of this paper. They may be of some
interest to readers, as an entire section of this work was initially to be dedicated to the
incorporation of contemporary science (especially some of the intuitions and
consequences of Einstein’s theory of Relativity) into Aquinas’s metaphysics of time and
motion. Unfortunately, most of the work that follows is not fully fleshed out, and is
neither rigorous nor perfectly phrased. Nevertheless, I have chosen to present them here
for those curious readers who may have enjoyed my above presentation on these subjects.
On the Incoherence of Divine Temporality
It must be pointed out that the general proposition of divine temporality is itself
logically incoherent. Metaphysically speaking, an effect is ontologically dependent on its
cause, not vice versa. In Aquinas’s view of eternity, God is conceived as a First Cause
and everything apart from Himself is wholly dependent on Him. Accordingly, he argues
that the act of creation does not imply a real change in God but only in the creature. But
in the divine temporalist’s conception of eternity, this particular effect of God’s creation
is so powerful that it can change the being of its cause substantially. In such a situation, it
seems only reasonable to question which of the two is the actual cause. For it could
easily be asked, how is it that God can be the cause of the universe if the universe affects
God? And if the universe affects God, then is it not also a cause? But if the universe is a
cause of God, then what difference is there between God and the world? The denial of
Aquinas’s sharp distinction between God as First Cause and creation as effect
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necessitates that God be (impossibly) contingent upon his own creation, leading to an
infinite regress of cause-and-effect between God and the world. The philosophical
complexities of the mere notion of a shared order of being between God and creation
seem insurmountable, let alone when considered in light of other metaphysical questions.
On Omnipresence and Omnitemporality
If space and time are linked (as Aristotle, Aquinas, and Einstein suppose), then we
should be able to use God’s relationship to space as analogous to His relationship with
time. Virtually no Christian theologian would dispute the idea that God is spaceless, yet
the way this “spacelessness” is understood is a bit paradoxical. We do not mean (as the
word itself may imply) that God is absent from all points in space; rather, we mean that
spatial references and relations do not apply to God in the same way they do to us. We
cannot go to a particular spatial location and say “God is here” or point elsewhere and say
“God is there.” Such statements imply that the totality of God’s presence can be found in
a single point, and—whether referentially inclusive of or in exclusion to all other spatial
points—it seems that such a statement cannot help but be false is evident. Even if we say
God is “omnipresent,” we do not mean that God is located at the aggregate collection of
all spatial points; rather, we mean that God is, in some way, “beyond” spatial categories,
of course including spatial location. The thesis of God’s lack of spatial measurability is
similarly uncontroversial, for the reasons given above. We may speak of the “depth” of
God, but we do not mean this in terms of spatial measure. If one were to suggest God
could literally be measured spatially, I suspect the vast majority of Christians would
(rightly) conclude that such a person was unorthodox at best.
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Yet inevitably, Christians have historically (and even up to this day) referred to
God as a dynamic, moving entity, with spatial relations and properties. The fact is that we
often do attribute spatial motion to God, whether we like to or not. This is most vividly
illustrated in various forms of liturgical expression going as far back as the Psalms. No
one would speak literally of measuring God’s “length” or “height.” Yet in liturgical
reflection this seems to be quite the opposite.
We have thus arrived at a point where contention could easily erupt: does God
have spatial properties or not? To answer simply either in the affirmative or negative
seems to safeguard particularly crucial properties of God at the expense of equally crucial
properties. Perhaps what many readers may regard as the most obvious solution is to
affirm both and abide with the paradox: of course God does not bear spatial relations
precisely as we do, but that does not mean that we cannot speak of the presence of God as
being ‘here’ in a higher, more poetical sense of the term. That God is not spatially
measurable does not mean we cannot speak as though He is, or that the statement ‘God is
here’ may not also fittingly be applied to Him.131
The same argument could be applied with regard to God’s temporal
measurability. To suggest that God is temporally immeasurable is not necessarily to deny
Him certain aspects of temporal existence. It is only to say that our temporal (and spatial)
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Incidentally, the willingness to live with and abide by theological paradox is a defining characteristic
(albeit a somewhat stereotypical one) of Jewish thought; one need look no farther than the Talmud and its
notorious lack of conclusions to recognize this. The logical principles of non-contradiction and the
“excluded middle” are products of Aristotelian logic; decidedly Greek in its origin. Those who insist upon
an abandonment of Greek philosophy in favor of a “return to Hebrew Christianity” and simultaneously
demand a firm either/or position be taken with regard to divine temporality are, it seems to me, highly
inconsistent.
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analogies of His being in the world are nothing but crude approximations132 to God’s
actual relations to space and time. Indeed, if God possesses any relations to space, the
best way those relations could be described as completely and wholly “other” than the
spatial relations experiences by humans on a daily basis. If time and space are linked,
then much the same could be said for God’s temporal relations.
On the Congruence of Aquinas with
Contemporary Science
The relevance of Aquinas’s thoughts on immutability and the nature of time for
the contemporary world has heretofore been mentioned primarily for its philosophical
and theological merits. However, the significance of Aquinas for science has as yet gone
unmentioned. Regrettably, the necessarily limited scope and length of this work has been
primarily responsible for this; nevertheless, it seems crucial to at least broach the question
as to whether a position so antiquated as Aquinas’s is even worth considering, especially
in light of recent developments in various scientific theories of the nature and properties
of time.
Feser has argued at length for the congruence of Aristotelianism with modern
science.133 It is not within the scope of this work to defend this claim; I can only refer
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One could argue that the meaning of the term “approximation” here is stretched to the breaking point. It
may be best to say they are “educated guesses” more than anything else. “For now we see in a mirror,
dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have
been fully known” (1 Corinthians 13:12, NRSV)
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Feser, Edward, Aristotle’s Revenge, 246 (emphasis original): “the very possibility of science
presupposes the reality and irreducibility of the conscious, thinking, embodied subject. Hence we cannot
coherently eliminate that subject from our conception of the world, especially not in the name of science.
[…] we cannot in turn make sense of this subject without deploying the fundamental concepts of
Aristotelian philosophy of nature, such as actuality and potentiality, form and matter, and efficient and final
causality. […] Thus does Aristotle have his revenge against those who have overthrown him in the name of
modern science. But he is a magnanimous victor, providing as he does the true metaphysical foundations
for the very possibility of that science.”
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readers to his Aristotle’s Revenge, which is particularly detailed in arguing the necessity
of Aristotelianism for modern science.134 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that figures
so prominent as Hegel and Heisenberg recognized the implicit debt owed Aristotle by
modern science.135 Boman, writing with the explicit intention of demonstrating the
“static” mode of Greek thinking, nevertheless must concede the intuitive connections
between Aristotle’s thought on the nature of time and Einstein’s theories of relativity:
“[Aristotle’s analysis of the essence of time] achieves such a depth and subtlety
that a modern commentator, filled with admiration, can say that his analysis of the
essence of time opens a direct path to the four-dimensional algebra to which so
much attention is given in connexion with the theory of relativity.”136
Such thoughts are bolstered by Carlo Rovelli’s argument that Aristotle’s intuition that
time is “the number of movement in respect of the before and after”137 is an important
component of Einstein’s theory of relativity; specifically, Rovelli suggests that Einstein’s
theory forged a synthesis between Aristotle’s relative theory of time with Newton’s
absolute theory of time.138 Though one might be tempted to suggest that this synthesis
makes Aristotle’s thoughts on the issue irrelevant altogether, this is simply not the case.
In the first place, even if Einstein was entirely correct in his scientific description of time,
134

Attempting a pithy summary of Feser’s work in such little space would do a great disservice to the rigor
of his analysis; accordingly, I must be content to merely refer readers to his work. Here I should also
recommend Edward Grant’s Science and Religion to readers. Grant’s work demonstrates that many of the
advances of modern science were due to the metaphysical and methodological groundwork laid by
Medieval (Aristotelian) Christianity.
135
“Einstein once remarked that ‘modern physics is Greek philosophy,’ which applies especially to The
Physics of Aristotle. Werner Heisenberg, father of quantum physics, offered a similar assessment. He had
Aristotle’s physics memorized by heart in the original Attic Greek. [Finally, Hegel has said, in his
Vorlesungen über die Gesch. der Philos.] ‘He penetrated into the whole universe of things, and subjected
its scattered wealth to intelligence; and to him the greater number of the philosophical sciences owe their
origin and distinction.’” William Dunn, Alcuin Institute of Catholic Culture, e-mail correspondence to
author, November 12, 2019.
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Boman, Thorleif, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, 125.
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Aristotle, “Time” in Metaphysics, 98.
138
Rovelli, Carlo, The Order of Time, translated by Erica Segre and Simon Carnell (U.K.: Penguin Books,
2018), 57ff.
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Aristotle’s thoughts on time would become more relevant as a component part of
Relativity Theory. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case, as Einstein’s Special and
General Theories of Relativity are incomplete and do not work well with the scientific
findings of Quantum Theory. Furthermore, Einstein’s theory, limited by its materialistic
suppositions, would only amount to an explanation of physical time,139 leaving the
discussion open for Aristotle’s (and, hence, Aquinas’s) broader conception of time.
All this may be well and good, but one may ask where the relevance of such
considerations leaves Aquinas’s thought. The answer for this is fairly straightforward: as
Aristotle’s Medieval champion, Aquinas’s relevance for discussions of General Relativity
are at least in proportion to his reliance upon Aristotle for his definitions and thoughts on
the nature of time. As I have attempted to show above, however, Aquinas is much more
than a mere Aristotelian, and is well worth considering in his own right. With regard to
this, I must simply defer again to the work of others such as Gilson and Feser,140 who
argue for Aquinas’s relevance in this respect better than I can…
That said, much work has yet to be done on this subject. What is particularly
stinging about Mullins’s work (and why it has been of such critical importance to this
study) is his fundamental argument that while a presentist141 ontology of time enjoyed

The concept of “physical” time is well explained in Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 32–35. Its
counterpart concept, metaphysical time, is covered in the same work, pages 35ff.
140
Attempting a pithy summary of Feser’s work in such little space would do a great disservice to the rigor
of his analysis; accordingly, I must be content to merely refer readers to his work. Here I should also
recommend Edward Grant’s Science and Religion to readers. Grant’s work demonstrates that many of the
advances of modern science were due to the metaphysical and methodological groundwork laid by
Medieval (Aristotelian) Christianity.
141
Presentism is the belief that only the present moment exists, while past and future ones do not. This is
based upon the intuitive notion that present objects have a privileged status in our minds as being “more
real” than past or future objects. For a detailed treatment of the subject with respect to Open Theism, see
David M. Woodruff, “Presentism and the Problem of Special Relativity” in William Hasker, Thomas Jay
139
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wide endorsement by many Patristic and Medieval theologians, it is fundamentally
contradictory to the classical model of God: “Divine timelessness, simplicity, and strong
immutability bring serious difficulties for Christian theology when combined with
presentism. If one is a presentist and a Christian, [sic] she should not believe that God is
timeless, simple, or strongly immutable.”142 Yet presentism has emerged into the fore of
contemporary discussions about the implications of Relativity Theory for a Christian
theology of time. If it is to be argued that Aquinas’s position is relevant to the discussion,
it will have to be shown that Mullins’s conclusions are mistaken.
On Einstein’s Reference Frames
Einstein’s biggest contribution to theology is the idea of reference frames; there is
no preferred reference frame. We use them all the time. Classical theologians may cringe
at the notion of suggesting God “moves”, but equally would (orthodox) theologians
cringe at the notion that man has reached for God. Various reference frames can explain
the same phenomenon, though one reference frame may give a more accurate or useful
description of the phenomenon in question for a particular purpose.
The idea of inertial reference frames is not, by any means, in conflict with
Aquinas’s theology of God’s immutability or relations to His creation. In fact, they
provide a useful way of conceptualizing the relationship between analogical and literal
predication of God. As Aquinas says, there is nothing wrong with analogically attributing
motion to God, provided that God’s “change” in relation to objects is conceptualized as
resulting from changes in the creation and not in God Himself. This is similar to a
Oord, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.) God in an Open Universe: Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism
(Eugene: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 94–124.
142
Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 122.
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passenger on a train commenting on the scenery that appears to him to be “passing him
by.” By similar analogy, we can truly speak of the “movement of God” in our midst
without needing to literally suggest that God is actually moving, just as it would be
preposterous for the passenger on the train to insist that the trees along the track are
actually moving because it appears to him to be so.
The issue thus arises when we describe the relative change between Creator and
created from the temporal reference frame without acknowledging that this is being done.
According to Aquinas, there is nothing wrong with saying that God “moves” or
“changes” provided that we understand the fundamentally metaphorical nature of this
expression. The chief danger lies not in speaking about God as though He changes; it is
rather in exalting the human reference frame to the extent that we attribute creaturely
change (and, hence, finitude) to God.
On God’s Lack of Temporal Measure
To say that God “lacks temporal measure” is not to say that God has no duration,
nor that He possesses nor experiences no time; rather, it is to say that His duration cannot
be differentiated (and hence measured) over time. Were we to attempt a mathematical
analogy for this concept, one might suggest that attempting to measure God’s duration is
like trying to divide by zero, or trying to divide infinity by infinity, or trying to find a real
solution to the equation x = √− 1 .
To say that God does not have temporal duration is not to say anything limiting
about God, but rather about us; it is our finite categories, language, and cognition that
prevent us from “measuring” God’s duration. We should not be surprised, then (and most
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certainly ought not be offended!), when Aquinas says, quite reasonably so, that just as
God’s size cannot be measured with a meter-stick since God is not spatial, so God’s
duration cannot be measured by a clock since God is not temporal.
On the Rise of Divine Temporalism
What could have contributed to this gap in thinking? Though falling somewhat
outside of the scope of this research, I strongly suspect that the advent of deism, along
with its popularity among the academic during the Enlightenment and Modern eras,
played a significant role in shaping the discussion of contemporary metaphysics. As it
became more commonplace to find deists and even atheists among the highest tiers of
academia, and as the creation of new secular states demanded religious neutrality in
public education systems, committed Christians began to react against the trend of
“liberalization” in favor of adopting a more fundamental approach to Christian theology.
Broadly speaking, these more fundamental movements would give rise to Evangelicalism
in general, which would come to re-engage the Academy in its quest to push forth the
Gospel in an ever-more-educated world. Unfortunately, new to the Academic world,
Evangelicals would adopt the presuppositions of the secularized Academy, including
those that surrounded the “Dark Ages” which conveniently aligned with many Protestant
suspicions of Roman Catholicism. The result of all this is an inherent bias in evangelical
scholarship against Medieval philosophy in general (as it is “opposed” and “antiquated”
to Modernism) and Medieval theology in particular (in that it it “Papist” and
pre-Reformation). Thus the doctrine of divine simplicity has both its Medieval-ness and
its Catholicity counted against it.
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This is, admittedly, somewhat simplified, as there has been something of a
resurgence of interest in the Early Church for many Evangelicals. Such interest seems to
me largely apologetic in nature, motivated (at least popularly) by the “quests for the
historical Jesus” and a general interest in the Jewish origins of Christianity. Notably,
however, much of this interest does not seem to extend far past Constantine, perhaps
because this violates Modernist sensibilities about Church and State. Alternatively, this
may also be the result of Modernity’s rejection of Scholasticism, which incorporated
Aristotle into the existing Neo-Platonic Christian tradition.
Of course, these are merely speculative generalizations, and confirmation of these
theories would require extensive further research. However, certain scholars, such as
Dolezal, have argued that divine simplicity was taken for granted in the early Protestant
tradition, prior to the Enlightenment…
On Epistemic Modal Collapse
Even granting Craig and Mullins’s use of “possible world” semantics, it seems far
from obvious to me that the only way to achieve a modal collapse—which Mullins
admits gives Thomists a valid “way out”—is by limiting God’s freedom. Contrary to
Mullins, I think that those in favor of Aquinas can advocate for an epistemic modal
collapse on the basis of God’s actuality.
It seems to me that the ultimate goal of modal logic should be to understand the
actual world better. To this end, we may discuss “possible worlds” as much as is
necessary; however, if the goal is to understand the actual world, we must also
epistemically restrict o ur speculations to only those possible worlds which are most like
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the actual world. Thus, if we must restrict our speculations of possible worlds to those in
which there is a (Christian) God who creates, then the possible world in which God did
not create the world must be thrown out (since it is not a possible world anything like our
own). In point of fact, we can continue to restrict our speculations by throwing out other
possible worlds that do not line up with the state of affairs in our actual world. We can
dispose of any “possible worlds” in which God, for example, chose not to create humans,
speak to Abraham and Moses, or incarnate as Jesus of Nazareth, since these are not
“possible worlds” in which God is recognizable as the Christian God. We can do this for
all of God’s past actions, whatever they may be, even up to God’s present actions.
Yet we can go further still. This is because—regardless of the seemingly
innumerable ways things may turn out—there can and will be only one state of affairs at
each future point in time. This conclusion naturally stems from the intuition that there is
only one reality: that which has been, is, and will be.143 And in this reality, there is only
one God, who acts as He has acted, is acting, and will act.
This, it seems to me, is precisely the “modal collapse” which Mullins has argued
against, yet as a result of trying to speak of the actual God who was, is, and will be, we
have concluded that Mullins’s “God who could have not created” does not exist precisely
because the God that does e xist has created. We have not arrived at this conclusion by
suggesting that God’s freedom is limited in the course of the foregoing argument; we
have only epistemically restricted o ur discussion of “possible worlds” to those that are
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consonant with the actual world. As there is only one actual world, and consequently
only one actual, “possible” God, we can conclude that there is only one possible version
of God: the God who is.
On Craig’s Anthropomorphic God
In conclusion, in the classical philosophy and theology God is conceived as an
ultimate principle. In this view, God is the First Cause and everything except him
came into being thanks to His act of creation. The fact that God is the First Cause
means that there is a radical, sharp distinction between God and his creatures in
terms of mode of being. For that reason, medieval philosophers never approve of
the idea of God’s becoming temporal and try to explain God’s relationship with
the temporal world in accordance with this metaphysical framework. But in
Craig’s view of eternity, because he concedes that God becomes temporal with
creation, it is very difficult to explain, at least after creation, the difference
between the Creator and the creature. Likewise, his idea that God became
temporal because of His relation with temporal beings is controversial. For, if
God, as Craig claims, becomes temporal due to His relations with temporal beings
it might also be thought that He becomes spatial due to His relations with spatial
things. Of course, God might be conceived as a temporal and even a spatial being
but it is clear that such a conception of God is more anthropomorphic than the
timeless one.144
Contra Gunton
“Which is the graver insult; to err on the side of saying the Christian God is
utterly beyond our pithy conceptions of time, or to err on the side of saying the same God
is moving and acting as we are?”145 Truly, either side could be framed as an insult, but
perhaps the greater insult is to say God’s motion is entirely limited and explained by our
(uncontestedly primitive) categorizations of space and time. Furthermore, it could be
argued that to say that God “moves” just as a human does is an insult to His higher, more
perfect degree of motion.
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On Henri Bergson
Bergson argues that conceptualizing spatial movement as “the passage of an
object through successive points” only complicates the question.146 Rather than
attempting to apprehend the pure phenomenon of movement itself, Bergson argues that
traditional (scientific) approaches to the question have inserted the idea of an infinite
number of mathematical points of space which the object passes through, then attempts to
describe the “mysterious passing” of the object from discrete point to point. The entire
process could be simplified by discarding the conceptualization of points altogether and
just apprehending the “mysterious passing” in its purest form. Much the same, Bergson
argues, could be said of time. Bergson suggests that thinking of time as an aggregate sum
of infinitely many states of an object between two points in time does nothing to explain
the mystery by which an object changes from one state to the next; in defining “time” as
such, we rob the object of its continuity from state to state that makes the concept of
“change” meaningful.
Divine temporalists may think that Bergson is on their side here. However, I do
not see how any of these observations in themselves are much different from Aquinas’s.
In fact, there seems to be a great deal of similarity in the way the two think about time.
For Aquinas, God’s duration is eternity, which is “simultaneously-whole.” This means
that there is a lack of differentiability in God’s duration, which means that he undergoes
no “change” in time; rather, He remains continuous between two points in time unaltered.
This in no way contradicts Bergson’s complaint that movement in itself does not consist

146

Bergson, Intro to Metaphysics, 42–43.

81

of points in space, nor duration points in time. Given Bergson’s point that “duration”
does not consist of mere points in time but rather that by which an object passes from one
point to the next, one could argue that all duration in itself is to some degree
immeasurable, which only solidifies Aquinas’s position rather than detracting from it.
In fact, it seems to me that Bergson’s point that the analysis of an object cannot
give rise to an intuitive apprehension of the phenomenon in itself seems perfectly in line
with Aquinas. Aquinas’s analysis of God paradoxically concludes that God remains both
unmoved (insofar as movement entails imperfection) and moved (insofar as stasis entails
imperfection). This parallels Bergson’s analysis that duration seems to consist of both
unity (continuity of the experience of duration) and multiplicity (multiple states that
blend together seamlessly in time). Yet Bergson and Aquinas both conclude that, though
there are paradoxes to be found in their respective analyses of the subject, this in no way
entails that their analyses are false, or that only one of their two conclusions is true. In
point of fact, those who followed Bergson, such as Alfred North Whitehead and Charles
Hartshorne, came to such paradoxical conclusions themselves.147
Where Bergson departs from Aquinas, however, is when he suggests that “reality
is mobility. Not things made, but things in the making, not self-maintaining states, but
only changing states, exist. Rest is never more than apparent, or, rather, relative.”148 A
few comments are in order. Foremost, it seems apparent to me that Bergson’s lattermost
point here seems to rest upon the claim that motion should be considered as prior to
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stasis. This seems roughly parallel to Aquinas’s claim that act is prior to potential,149 and
is perhaps not controversial. However, where Bergson departs from Aquinas is in
assuming that mobility necessarily implies change. According to Aquinas, as we have
seen above, God is capable of mobility without change. If this is correct, then Bergson’s
claim that “only changing states exist”—the premise upon which divine temporalists
make their case—cannot be applied to God.
Further, Bergson goes on to suggest that “fixed concepts may be extracted by our
thought from mobile reality; but there are no means of reconstructing the mobility of the
real with fixed concepts.”150 This statement is, in some respects, directed against
scientific tendencies to attempt reconstruction of a phenomenon from without rather than
within. However, this has not stopped divine temporalists from suggesting that Aquinas’s
analysis of God’s lack of temporal measure erroneously concludes His immutability on
the grounds that such analysis comes from a human attempt to describe God from the
outside, rather than allowing God to reveal His internal experience of time. However,
such criticisms seem to neglect the fact that Aquinas himself acknowledged the
limitations that reason has when considering God, particularly in relation to the
knowledge that revelation provides the Christian…
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